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A supplied image obtained 8 March 2015 shows CCTV vision of two teenage brothers suspected of trying to fly to the 
Middle East to fight. Sydney Airport officials seen with the two brothers. © AAP Image/ Sydney Airport.
ChAPteR 1
Introduction
In May 2015, the Australian Government estimated that more than 100 Australians were fighting for terrorist 
groups in Syria and Iraq. At least 24 had died fighting (Lewis 2015 p.79), more than 30 had returned to Australia and 
there were 160 people ‘supporting terrorist organisations from Australia’ (Australian Government 2015a). Since 
the terrorism threat level was raised to ‘high’ in September 2014, 23 people have been charged as a result of eight 
counterterrorism operations (Brandis 2015c). In each case the police argued that urgent pre-emptive action was 
needed to disrupt plans for staging terror attacks in Australia. The Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney in December 2014 and 
the stabbing attack on two police officers in Melbourne in September 2014 tragically showed that terrorist acts 
could take place on Australian soil. The government estimates that ‘The number of high-risk terrorist threats being 
monitored by security agencies has doubled in the last year and is now around 400’ (Australian Government 2015a).
This paper examines the scope and nature of terrorism in Australia and assesses the policy response. We explore 
the threat of terrorism motivated by violent Islamist extremism and offer policy recommendations to counter that 
threat. Using a dataset of extremist jihadists constructed by ASPI, Section 2 examines specific themes and issues 
that affect Australia and profiles some of the individuals who have advocated or become violent Islamists. Section 3 
provides an overview of terrorist attacks in the West since 2010 and of Western ‘foreign fighters’ in the Middle East. 
Section 4 assesses the Australian policy response to date, and Section 5 offers policy recommendations.
We don’t propose that the government create large new structures or make increases to the budget beyond what 
has already been provided—many of the recent government policy responses, although reactive, provide the right 
authorities and levels of funding. Our recommendations focus on taking new approaches with existing organisations 
or reinforcing old approaches that have proved effective. Governments should avoid over-reaction, which terror 
groups hope to provoke. We focus instead on the importance of better communication and cooperation across 
government and society as a whole.
Australian law defines a terrorist act as ‘an act or threat, intended to advance a political, ideological or religious 
cause by coercing or intimidating an Australian or foreign government or the public. This action must cause serious 
harm to people or property, create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public, or seriously disrupt trade, 
critical infrastructure or electronic systems’ (NCTC 2011).
For this study, we define violent Islamist extremists as people who have adopted views associated with Islamist 
extremism and are willing to support or commit terrorist acts. Groups or individuals described as ‘Islamist’ often 
have very different aims and views about how those aims might be realised. Some militant Islamists endorse 
violence to achieve their aims, but many Islamists do not. Islamist extremism is characterised as an ideology that’s 
based on a distorted interpretation of Islam. Islamist extremists deem Western intervention in Muslim countries 
as a ‘war on Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them’ and ‘us’. They aspire to impose a caliphate: a global Islamic state 
governed by their interpretation of sharia as state law, rejecting liberal values such as democracy and the rule of 
law. We use the term ‘jihadist’ because it has become a common way to describe supporters of extremist Islamist 
violence, but we recognise that jihad also connotes a sense of legitimate inner spiritual struggle for many Muslims.
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Why and how do people who live in Australia become violent Islamist extremists? What processes do they go 
through to radicalise and what can be done about it? A commonly used description of the radicalisation process 
highlights four stages: pre-radicalisation, self-identification or conversion and identification, indoctrination and 
finally jihadisation (or commitment to action).
Although there mightn’t be a single terrorist profile, we note three shared characteristics often found in people 
who radicalise:
• A sense of injustice or humiliation—Terrorists often explicitly justify their attacks as an appropriate response to a 
perceived injustice against a group of people, who aren’t necessarily related to the terrorists.
• A need for identity—Individuals who don’t feel a sense of identity may be searching for a defining purpose or goal 
in life (Neumann 2007).
• A need to belong—Prospective terrorists find a sense of belonging in their association with terrorist groups or 
causes (Crenshaw 1988).
Spiritual mentorship and social network bonds are also important factors. Terrorists don’t go through a 
radicalisation process in isolation. A study of UK and US homegrown terrorism cases found that around 20% 
had a spiritual mentor who provided guidance during radicalisation and justification and approval for violent 
action. Social networks and interpersonal relationships are vital for recruitment into terrorist organisations 
(Sageman 2004).
The increased number of English language websites advocating jihad assists radicalisation and the production of 
homegrown terrorists. When no physical mentor or social network is available individuals can find support online, 
along with a sense of purpose, identity and belonging.
The role of religious ideology is more controversial among researchers. Marc Sageman assesses that religious 
ideology is incidental and not causal to radicalisation, instead providing only a weak pretext or justification. 
However Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt in a study for the New York City Police Department, found that the adoption 
of a salafi ideology was at the core of radicalisation (Silber & Bhatt 2007, Precht 2007). It seems clear that Islamist 
ideology is used by spiritual mentors, recruiters and terrorist social networks as a vehicle for radicalisation. Whether 
countering ideology can be part of a policy solution is still up for debate. For example, there’s a body of research on 
deradicalisation and disengagement programs that seek to take surrendered or captured violent Islamist extremists 
and prevent recidivism or the radicalisation of others (Horgan & Altier 2012). Such approaches have not been 
well received in Australian public debate. Our secular society struggles to understand how to deal with religious 
motivations behind extremist ideological behaviour.
Social scientists tend to rule out three factors that some believe are causal to acts of terrorism. First, researchers 
conclude that there’s no single terrorist profile (Sageman 2004, Bakker 2006). Ethnicity, education, marital status 
and socioeconomic levels don’t point to a predominant terrorist profile. As we show in this study there are 
many individual paths to radicalisation. A second misconception is that radicalisation can be blamed on mental 
illness. Reports of the Sydney siege in December 2014 perpetuated this view because, in the case of Man Haron 
Monis, there was a history of mental illness. Our study does not find mental illness to be a widespread factor, but 
detailed research is needed to establish potential connections between mental illness and radicalisation. Finally, 
radicalisation to the point of being prepared to commit violent acts isn’t a predetermined outcome. People who 
begin a path to radicalise mightn’t necessarily complete the journey to become terrorists. This is a significant finding 
given the current policy emphasis on developing strategies to counter violent extremism. 
Defeating terrorism and removing the sources of inspiration for radical extremism calls upon a massive array of 
policy responses covering everything from military operations in the Middle East to school curricula and involves a 
bewildering collection of state and federal government agencies and community groups. There is surely no more 
complex policy problem currently facing the country. It is also clear that governments cannot successfully develop 
counter-terrorism policy without the closest engagement of all sections of the community. Nothing less is at stake 
than the nature of Australian society. 
ChAPteR 2 
The Australian experience
Gen Y jihadists—contemporary radicalisation in Australia
Australian citizens who have become extremist jihadists since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 are, on 
average, younger and better educated than a previous generation of Australians who radicalised in the late 1990s 
and after al-Qaeda’s attacks in the US in 2001. Gen Y jihadists are mostly born in Australia and have diverse ethnic 
backgrounds. In some cases, friends and community networks have nurtured their radical views; in others, online 
media have enabled their radicalisation quite separately from family and community.
A distinguishing feature of Australian Gen Y jihadists has been their willingness to travel to Syria and Iraq to fight in a 
sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. Opposition to the Assad regime in Damascus has 
been a prime motivator, although this has broadened following the military campaign in Iraq by the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS) to oppose the predominantly Shia Iraqi Government and its Western and Iranian 
supporters. Australian jihadists have died in surprisingly large numbers fighting in such conflicts, the origins and 
drivers of which aren’t well understood in this country.
A second feature of Australian Gen Y jihadists has been their willingness to participate in making propaganda 
material, earlier versions of which helped to recruit them. ISIL’s slick propaganda machine enables it to dominate a 
wider field of terror groups in recruiting foot soldiers and others useful to its putative ‘caliphate’.
Australia’s experience of radicalisation is similar to that of the US, the UK, Canada and other developed Western 
countries. There are differences based on the historical experience of countries as past colonial powers, previous 
patterns of immigration and the nature of relations between communities. But social media grafts a global overlay 
onto these national experiences. An Australian Gen Y jihadist is just as able to communicate with a like-minded 
friend in the UK or the Middle East as they are to engage with friends living in the same suburb.
Australian jihadists before the Syrian war
Australian researchers Andrew Zammit and Sam Mullins made detailed studies of the characteristics of around 
30 local jihadists in the 1990s and the first decade of this century. This work shows a broad similarity between 
Australian and other Western experiences of radicalisation. Among 36 individuals investigated, Mullins (2011) found 
as follows:
• The average age of those promoting violent jihad was 28, and 29 at the time of their arrests.
• 94% were Australian citizens; 86% had ‘non-Australian heritage (more than half being Lebanese)’; 57% were born 
in Australia.
• 12% of 38 individuals were converts to Islam.
• Most had not progressed much beyond high school.
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• Only 5 of 24 individuals could be classified as having a skilled education.
• 17 of 23 individuals for whom data was available were married (74%).
• A relatively small percentage had a criminal background.
• Among the 12 individuals for whom information on criminal background was available, there were no confirmed 
cases of mental illness.
Zammit’s work points to similar conclusions. Reviewing the same period, he found that the Australian jihadists were 
‘disproportionately poorly educated’ compared with jihadists from other Western countries and with the Australian 
Muslim community. The jihadists didn’t have ‘devoutly Muslim upbringings’. Australian jihadists were more likely 
to have been born in Australia than jihadists from other Western nations were to have been born in their countries. 
Like Mullins, Zammit found a high proportion of jihadists who had family origins in Lebanon (Zammit 2011, 
Zammit et al. 2014).
Syria and Australia’s Gen Y jihadists
The Syrian conflict, the spread of ISIL into Iraq, the international response involving air strikes, and a constant 
stream of online propaganda videos primarily from ISIL are combining to spur an increase in the number of 
Australians willing to fight in Syria or Iraq and potentially to commit terrorist acts in Australia. In this study, we 
present brief biographies (based on open sources) of 16 Australians who have fought in the Middle East and planned 
or supported violent Islamism there or in Australia since 2011. These individuals have been prominently reported in 
the Australian and international media and we set out details at the end of this section. Appendix 1 provides data for 
a total of 54 people, whose activities have been widely reported in the media. 
Although we have exhaustively searched the public report we stress that our information is incomplete—
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) figures show that a significantly higher number of individuals 
are of concern to officials. The number of Australians being radicalised is also growing quickly. For example, the 
government stated in early May 2015 that, in the eight months from August 2014 to April 2015, new counterterrorism 
units operating at eight major Australian international airports ‘assisted in offloading 267 passengers of security 
concern’ from air flights (Australian Government 2015a). In evidence presented to a Senate Committee on 25 May 
the number of passengers offloaded had grown to 284 persons, pointing to a steady increase in the numbers of 
people motivated to travel that present security concerns (Quaedvlieg 2015 p.47).
Within the limits of available reporting, what informed generalisations, if any, can be made about this group? An 
obvious point is that there’s significant diversity of age, ethnic background, education and career experience, 
mental health issues and other factors. Policy thinking must take this diversity into account.
Age
Of the 54 people examined for this study, an approximate age is known for 47 at the time of their death or the time of 
publication. Their average age is just over 25.
Thirty-nine travelled to the Middle East. Of the 32 whose age we know, the average age was 24. Twenty were killed 
in fighting or in suicide bomb attacks, including four in Iraq. We know the age of 18 of the 20 people killed—they 
averaged just under 25 years of age.
Of the 15 individuals whose actions brought them to the attention of authorities in Australia, the average age is 27.5. 
However, that figure includes Man Haron Monis (50), who acted alone and is sui generis to the broader terrorism 
phenomenon, and Abdul Nacer Benbrika (54), who was arrested in 2005 as part of Operation Pendennis and is said 
to be a recruiter for ISIL from his jail cell in Victoria. If those two men are excluded, the average age of the remaining 
individuals is just under 24.
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Of great concern is the apparent attraction of ISIL propaganda for some people in their late teens. Abdul Numan 
Haider was shot and killed at the age of 18 in Melbourne in a stabbing attack on police officers in September 
2014. Jake Bilardi was killed detonating a suicide bomb in Ramadi, Iraq, at age 18 in March 2015. Adam Dahman 
killed himself and five people in a suicide bomb attack in an Iraq market in July 2014 at age 17. Abdullah Elmir left 
Melbourne in June 2014 and has since appeared in ISIL propaganda material at age 18. Wider media reporting 
suggests that some individuals are denied flights out of Australia when their parents ring authorities to ask that their 
children be denied passports.
An older group of people act as facilitators and mentors for younger recruits. For example, Mohammed Ali Baryalei, 
until his death in October 2014 at age 33, was known to be a successful jihadist recruiter in Sydney, using a network 
of people to identify young potential fighters. He travelled to Syria to fight for Jabhat al-Nusra in April 2013, switched 
support to ISIL in June 2013 and worked at the Turkish–Syrian border facilitating passage for Australians entering to 
fight for ISIL. Sydney man Hamdi Al Qudsi, 40, was committed to stand trial in November 2014, accused of recruiting 
Australians to fight with terrorists in Syria. Police allege he assisted with the travel arrangements of six young men 
who left Australia to fight with Islamic State in 2013 (Hoerr 2015).
While older people may play mentoring roles, age is no barrier to online recruitment efforts. ISIL propaganda 
emphasises the recruitment value of putting younger supporters in front of the camera, including Neil Prakash, a 
23-year-old Australian of Fijian-Indian and Cambodian background, who allegedly encouraged teenagers to carry 
out a plot to kill police and members of the public on Anzac Day 2015.
Country of birth and ethnic background
Tables 1 and 2 show the 54 individuals’ countries of birth and ethnic or family backgrounds, respectively, based on 
open-source information.
Table 1:  Country of birth (n = 54)
Country of birth Number %
Afghanistan 4 7.41
Algeria 1 1.85
Australia 23 42.59
Egypt 1 1.85
Iraq 1 1.85
Iran 1 1.85
Kuwait 1 1.85
Lebanon 1 1.85
Libya 1 1.85
Somalia 1 1.85
Sudan 1 1.85
Syria 1 1.85
US 1 1.85
Unknown 16 29.63
Total 54 100
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Table 2:  Ethnic/family background (n = 54)
Ethnic/family background Number %
Afghani 4 7.41
African American / 
Anglo-Australian
1 1.85
Albanian 1 1.85
Algerian 1 1.85
Anglo-Australian 5 9.26
Bangladeshi 1 1.85
Bosnian 1 1.85
Egyptian 1 1.85
Fijian–Indian / Cambodian 1 1.85
German / Palestinian 1 1.85
Iranian 1 1.85
Iraqi 1 1.85
Iraqi / Italian 1 1.85
Kuwaiti 1 1.85
Lebanese 10 18.52
Lebanese / Anglo-Australian 1 1.85
Lebanese / Anglo-New 
Zealander
1 1.85
Libyan 1 1.85
Somali 4 7.41
Sudanese 1 1.85
Syrian 1 1.85
Turkish 3 5.56
Unknown 11 20.37
Total 54 100
 
Of the 38 individuals whose country of birth is known, 23 (42.59% of the 54), were born in Australia. Afghanistan 
was the birthplace of the next largest group (four people, 7.41%). What’s most striking is the diversity of birthplaces, 
which include the US, but with a strong representation of Middle Eastern states. It’s also striking that no North or 
Southeast Asian countries are represented. Almost all in the sample are or were Australian citizens and lived in 
Australia for long periods. Most attended school in Australia.
Ethnic or family background is also strikingly diverse. Lebanese (10 people, 18.52%), Anglo-Australian (5 people, 
9.26%) Afghani (4 people, 7.41%) and Somali (4 people, 7.41%) are the four largest ethnicities. The data suggests that 
the preponderance of people with Lebanese backgrounds identified by Zammit in his analysis of the first decade of 
Australian jihadists has reduced significantly. There’s a weighting towards countries with Muslim cultures, but it’s 
clear that radicalisation can affect people from any ethnic or family background.
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Figure 1:  Country of birth of individuals identified in our database
Figure 2:  ethnic/family background
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Education and career
The individuals we studied had a broad range of academic and career attainments, making it difficult to discern 
patterns. Some had been expelled from school, including Mahmoud Abdullatif in Year 11 and Khaled Sharrouf in Year 
9, for bashing another student. Others left school early: Bilardi, Dahman and Elmir dropped out in years 10, 11 or 12 
to join ISIL. Prakash was reportedly bullied at school and dropped out in Year 10. On 8 May 2015, a 17-year-old minor 
was arrested in Melbourne. He was charged with preparation of a terrorist act, in contravention of section 101.6 of 
the Criminal Code. Media reports indicate that this person had also dropped out of school, before starting to post 
extremist material online (ABC 2015). (We haven’t included the young people who were subject to the 8 May police 
operation in our assessment of average age, as they haven’t been named in open sources.)
More commonly, individuals completed school education (for example, Benbrika, Tareq Kamleh and Mohammed 
Kiad). A number studied at private Christian schools, including Baryalei, who attended two Catholic high schools 
and Amira Karroum, who attended an Anglican girls’ school.
A number of people we studied were recruited to terror groups shortly after completing their school studies. 
They included Suhan Rahman, Amira Karroum, Muhammed Sheglabo and Yusuf Yusuf. Others had begun tertiary 
education before committing an extremist act. Haider had been enrolled in an electrical engineering course at 
Dandenong TAFE, and Rahman was studying building management at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. 
Tareq Kamleh, who appeared in an ISIL propaganda video calling for medical professionals to join him in Syria, 
completed medical studies at Adelaide University in 2010.
The growing number of young Australians radicalising has been the focus of government attention and points to 
the need to address the role of schools. In some cases, jihadists may have recruited young adults who hadn’t yet 
developed the cognitive ability to make considered decisions and distinguish propaganda from truth. More research 
is needed into whether young recruits in some way lack the cognitive skills and judgement necessary to make 
rational decisions. Perhaps some are reaching a peak rebellious phase and their impulses are being misdirected into 
violent Islamist extremism.
Many Gen Y jihadists work in blue collar jobs, much like the first post-9/11 generation of Islamist extremists. 
Ahmed Succarieh was a bricklayer and Sulayman Khalid a part-time labourer. Mohamed Elomar was a champion 
featherweight boxer who received a boxing scholarship at the Australian Institute of Sport. Sammy Salma 
was a boxing trainer; Baryalei was a bouncer; Sharrouf was described in the media as ‘muscle for hire’ in the 
construction industry.
Among white collar professionals, Benbrika was an aviation engineer. Caner Temel served in the Army as a 
construction engineer at Enogerra Barracks in Brisbane before going missing from the ADF in 2010 and leaving to 
fight in Syria in July 2013. Kamleh was a paediatrician. Researchers Clark Jones and Greg Barton (2015) describe his 
radicalisation as follows:
While working in far north Queensland in 2013, Kamleh underwent a dramatic conversion. After returning from a 
camping trip with mysterious new friends he announced that he was giving up drinking and womanising and was 
turning his life around to obey God. Up until this point he had been running away from the religion of his parents. 
His mother, born a German Catholic, had converted to Islam to marry his Palestinian father.
A small number of jihadists worked in jobs associated with fringe organisations. Abdul Salam Mahmoud was a 
preacher in the Street Dawah movement in Sydney. Agim Kruezi was employed by the iQraa Islamic Centre. He was 
prevented from travelling overseas at Brisbane Airport in March 2014. In general, however, Australian Gen-Y jihadists 
had mainstream jobs. From working at Sea World (Karroum) to serving pizzas (Hussein El Sabsabi) and from being a 
‘male model’ (Sharky Jama) to a being a bricklayer (Succarieh), they had diverse jobs that defy easy categorisation. 
One generalisation worth making is that most of them seemed to be drifting, moving between jobs with little 
advancement or success and on the lookout for something better.
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Mental health
Of the 16 individuals for whom we developed detailed profiles, only three were reported to have mental health 
problems—most prominently, the Lindt Cafe terrorist, Man Haron Monis. The joint Australian and NSW government 
report into the incident (PM&C 2015a) stated that:
Monis experienced bouts of mental illness. He presented at public hospitals on at least two occasions, was 
treated at a community mental health service between 2010 and 2011, and was assessed a further two times 
as part of Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Screening assessment. Reviewing those cases, the NSW 
Chief Psychiatrist found that at no time in his multiple encounters with mental health professionals was Monis 
assessed to represent a potential risk to others or to himself.
A second individual was reported as using Islam as a solace for undefined mental health issues. A third individual 
who posted graphic images from Syria on social media, was said to suffer from schizophrenia. In line with 
international findings, we found that mental health problems haven’t been prevalent among Australian jihadists. 
However, the youngest recruits may lack critical thinking and risk assessment skills.
Subsequent sections in this report consider the role of social and community engagement as vital elements in 
radicalisation. Again, the striking feature is the diversity of experience of Gen Y jihadists. Overall, our assessment 
shows a group of people clearly failing to gain satisfaction or friendship in mainstream Australian life. Finding 
communities of like-minded people online or in the street, as was the case with Abdul Numan Haider at the 
al-Furqan Centre, can be a trigger for rapid radicalisation. But it’s also striking how some people can radicalise 
apparently without their families knowing—as in the case of the 17-year-old arrested in Melbourne on 8 May. Families 
may also perceive a worrying process but not know how to reverse it.
Communities
Research presented in The Australian newspaper identifies a number of geographic clusters of radicalised 
individuals, primarily in suburban Sydney and Melbourne. Although it remains the case that individuals can 
radicalise without an apparent social framework, the process is facilitated if there is a family or network of 
likeminded individuals. The Australian quoted an individual working with ‘at risk’ individuals in Sydney: ‘People 
feel that they’re being attacked by media and politicians and so on’ … ‘I think the end result is (that) once these 
youths feel they need to do something, they get caught up in this mission that’s going on ... then they try to justify it 
ideologically’ (Schleibs 2015).
Geography and personal relationships remain critically important factors in radicalisation. This is reflected in 
the cases of a number of Australian jihadists who have strong familial, friendship and association bonds. A senior 
Australian ISIL figure prior to his death in June 2015 was Mohamed Elomar; his uncle, Mohamed Ali Elomar, is 
currently serving a 21-year jail term for his role in the 2005 Operation Pendennis plot (Maley 2015b). Mohamed 
Elomar’s first wife Fatima and their four children were unsuccessful in their attempt to join him in May 2014. 
Counterterrorism police who stopped them as they tried to board a flight to Malaysia allege Fatima Elomar was 
carrying cash, camouflage equipment and medical supplies (Chettle 2015). Mohamed Elomar was also believed to 
have married Khaled Sharrouf’s 14-year-old daughter Zaynab in Syria (Olding 2015b). 
Neil Prakash, another Australian ISIL figure, was in contact with Abdul Numan Haider (Calligeros 2015). Haider 
was also in contact with Sevdet Besim and Harun Causevic, charged with an Anzac Day terror plot in April 2015 in 
Melbourne, hours before he died (Akerman 2015). These individuals were known to have attended the Al-Furqan 
Islamic Centre in Springvale (Baxendale 2015), which closed days after the raids disrupting the Anzac Day plot. 
The journey to becoming a violent Islamist extremist is a process, not a pass/fail exercise. People can tip at a point 
that will incline them to travel to Syria without necessarily understanding ISIL ideology. Indoctrination and the 
experience of combat in the Middle East can complete the process. A tipping point in Australia might be the person’s 
reaction to having a passport withheld or their response to ISIL propaganda, such as the declaration of the caliphate 
in mid-2014. 
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Australian foreign fighters
Route
The numbers of Australian extremist fighters in Iraq and Syria over the past few years is significantly larger than the 
30 or so Australians who travelled to fight in Afghanistan between 1990 and 2010 (Australian Government 2015a, 
Bishop 2015a).
There’s no standard route taken by Australians into Iraq and Syria, although most that are successful go to Turkey 
before crossing the border into the conflict region. There are reports that foreign fighters from the West leapfrog 
between several different places before finally ending up in Turkey to travel overland into Syria (Schliebs 2014). This 
is presumably done to elude authorities.
In a bid to address Turkey’s role as a foreign fighter transit point, Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Turkish Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu issued a joint statement on 22 April 2015, pledging to increase cooperation on 
counterterrorism. The pledge included Turkey’s commitment to introduce stricter border controls and increase 
information exchanges (World Bulletin 2015).
Many aspiring fighters are stopped at airports; in addition to the 284 people taken off flights, 116 passports have 
been cancelled since September 2012 and a further nine passports suspended since December 2014 (Varghese 
2015 p.96).
Arrival
While a number of Islamist militant groups operate in Syria and Iraq, most Australian foreign fighters inspired by 
extremist Islamist ideology are currently joining ISIL. Before ISIL’s rise to dominance, Australian jihadists mainly 
flowed to Jabhat al-Nusra; fewer are now joining that group.
When recruits arrive, they are reportedly given a new name, required to swear an oath of allegiance and must tear or 
burn their passports in a display of commitment to the caliphate. Mohamed Elomar echoed this ritual on his Twitter 
page, announcing that ‘burning his passport was the best day of his life’ (News.com.au 2014).
During their induction, would-be fighters are assessed to determine their most suitable role in the group. 
Attorney-General George Brandis has described Australians’ prospective roles as ‘cannon fodder, suicide bombers 
and propaganda tools’ (ABC 2014b). There is propaganda value in having foreigners willing to die on the front lines. 
It’s also a means of dealing with foreigners whom ISIL decides have limited military or other value. 
Jabhat al-Nusra has a stricter recruitment process. It’s been reported that before they are officially accepted into 
the group, would-be fighters must fight—and survive—on the front line (Australian Government n.d.). The group 
has developed a strategy that’s based more on elite fighters and has sought a lower profile than ISIL, so it relies 
less on injections of foreign fighters to sustain its efforts, although some Australians have joined the group, as is 
discussed below.
Roles
Despite Senator Brandis’s portrayal of Australians’ options with ISIL as being restricted to ‘cannon fodder’, 
some have taken leadership roles. Those individuals are of concern because they tend to have maintained or 
strengthened links to Australia and mentored aspiring foreign fighters remotely. Baryalei was considered to be the 
most senior Australian member of ISIL before his reported death. He’s believed to have assumed an operational 
command position and to have facilitated the travel of up to 30 recruits for both ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra (Olding 
2014b). It’s also been claimed that he ordered Sydney-based Omarjan Azari to commit an on-camera ‘execution’ 
in Australia. Following Baryalei’s reported death in October 2014, counterterrorism officials believe that Neil 
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Prakash replaced him as the top Australian recruiter for ISIL and that Prakash ordered the foiled Anzac Day attack 
(Wroe 2015).
Mostafa Mahamed (Sheikh Abu Sulayman Muhajir), a former extremist preacher in Australia, is believed to be a top 
official in Jabhat al-Nusra. Authorities have deemed him a ‘magnet’ for foreign fighters (Chambers 2014). The head 
of Sydney’s al-Risalah Islamic Centre likened Sulayman to Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Maley 2014a). Parallels with al-Awlaki are concerning, given his role in inspiring attacks in 
Western countries.
Australians in such leadership roles can establish themselves as mentors, recruiting more foreign fighters and 
ordering domestic attacks. Baryalei, Prakash and Sulayman show that people needn’t return to Australia to pose a 
threat to national security.
Frontline fighters and suicide bombers
Kurdish and Iraqi commanders have stated that foreign fighters make up almost all suicide bombers and first-wave 
attackers in the current conflict (Lake 2015). Australians who are reported to have fought on the front line include 
Sharrouf (convicted for a 2005 plot to attack the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor) and his accomplice, Elomar. Former 
ADF member Temel was on the front line for Jabhat al-Nusra before joining ISIL.
Australian suicide bombers have included Brisbane man Ahmed Succarieh, who drove an explosives-laden truck 
into a Syrian military checkpoint, killing 35 people. The most prominent Australian suicide bombers for ISIL were 
two unrelated 18-year-olds from Melbourne: Bilardi died in Ramadi, reportedly causing no fatalities other than his 
own, and Dahman died in a marketplace near a Shia mosque in Baghdad, killing five people.
Propaganda
Australians have featured consistently in ISIL’s regular stream of online videos over the past year and used 
strategically to attract further Western recruits, as in the cases of 17-year-old Elmir and Bilardi, who were heralded 
by ISIL online. Zakaryah Raad and Abu Yahya ash Shami were messengers in a June 2014 propaganda video titled 
There is no life without jihad. Kamleh also appeared in a recent ISIL clip that featured him in a purportedly ISIL-run 
hospital appealing to other skilled Muslims to aid the caliphate.
Foreign fighters are also engaged in unofficial propaganda via personal Facebook and Twitter accounts. Most 
notoriously, Sharrouf posted videos and photos on Twitter, including a picture of his child holding a decapitated 
head in August 2014. Rahman has also made many posts, including one calling for other Australians to ‘spill blood’. 
Non-military activities
Foreign fighters are said to control operations in ISIL’s self-declared capital, Raqqah, which it seized in June 2013 
(Trofimov 2015). ISIL apparently allocates city residences to foreign fighters in areas where there’s a reduced risk 
of airstrikes (Sly 2015). The Economist reported in August 2014 that ISIL-held territory received steady deliveries of 
goods and had satellite internet access, shortly after the airstrikes campaign began (Economist 2014). Residents 
report that the city’s immigrant population has grown by thousands as a result of the arrival of foreign ISIL recruits. 
The newcomers are reportedly ‘living in the best houses with free electricity and health care’, while Syrians in the 
area are treated ‘like slaves’ (Crowcroft & Limam 2015). It’s unclear how many Australians are present in Raqqah; 
however, Elomar and Sharrouf are believed to have been senior ISIL leaders in the town prior to news of their 
recently reported deaths in Mosul, Iraq. Former business student Yusuf Yusuf announced on social media that he’s 
‘chillen’ in Raqqah (Chambers 2015). In April 2014, a video made by British ISIL fighter Rawat al-Tahweed was filmed 
to contradict the perception of a ‘five-star jihad’ lifestyle propagated online (Ensor 2014). 
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Returning fighters
Early in 2015, the Australian Government announced that more than 30 Australians had returned from the conflict. 
While there’s been a sharp media focus on a small group of alleged foreign fighters returning from Syria—including 
the high-profile case of Adam Brookman—several factors should temper concerns about the problem. Many foreign 
fighters will never have the opportunity to return—reports indicate that nearly one in five have already been killed 
(Kimmorley 2014). Most of the at least 20 Australians killed so far reportedly died on the front lines, including Temel, 
kickboxing champion Roger Abbas and Rahman. Notably, Sharky Jama was reportedly disillusioned with ISIL and 
was planning to escape before he was killed (SBS 2015). Irfaan Hussein, it’s been claimed, may have been beheaded 
for attempting to leave ISIL (Owens 2015).
In the May 2015 Budget Estimates Committee hearings, the Director-General of ASIO, Duncan Lewis said of 
returning fighters:
There are about 30 Australians who have returned from Syria, but they were—I think it is true to say without 
exception—individuals who had returned … before ISIL became a recognised entity. In other words, they were 
young Australians who went away to involve themselves in the Syrian civil war (Lewis 2015 p. 80).
It is not yet clear if ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra have provided foreign fighters with financial or training support to 
attack Western targets, in the same way that al-Qaeda ‘central’ and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have 
done. The individual’s motivations are relevant too: many Australian foreign fighters express a desire to help fellow 
Muslims and to join the Syrian civil war, rather than focusing on grievances about the West. For example, relatives of 
Amira Karroum have stated that she was ‘desperate’ to help women and children.
Many foreign fighters’ motivation to join the caliphate suggests that they don’t want to return. They include Sharrouf 
and Elomar, who both attempted to move their families to Syria (Sharrouf succeeded, but Elomar’s family was 
stopped at the airport) and expressed disdain for Australia and the West.
The Profiles section of this ASPI Strategy points to the importance of networks between foreign fighters and Islamist 
extremists based in Australia. The conflict in Iraq and Syria provides fertile ground for solidifying those networks 
and expanding them to recruit others. Terrorism researcher Dr Thomas Hegghammer’s study on European foreign 
fighters concluded that less than one in nine returning fighters will commit a terrorist act at home (Hegghammer 
2013). However, of the 25 Australians who returned from the Afghan war, 19 subsequently took part in ‘activities of 
security concern’, and eight were convicted of offences (News.com.au 2015b).
Australia’s Caliphettes
In 2014, the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium estimated that as many as 15% of ISIL’s foreign recruits 
could be female, and that up to 200 women from at least 14 different countries had travelled to Iraq and Syria to 
join the group (Shubert & Naik 2014). By March 2015, the number of Western women known to have joined ISIL was 
estimated to have risen to around 550, and women may account for nearly one-fifth of all foreign recruits.
In an address to the Australian Parliament in February 2015, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop advised that up to 40 of 
the 550 or so Western women taking part in or supporting terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq are Australian.
The involvement of Western women in jihadist activities isn’t new. Samantha Lewthwaite (also known as the ‘White 
Widow’), the British wife of one the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings, is the most wanted female terrorist 
suspect in the world. Muriel Degauque, a 38-year-old Belgian woman, became Europe’s first female suicide bomber 
when she attacked a police patrol in Iraq in November 2005. And American Colleen LaRose, known as ‘Jihad Jane’, 
is currently serving time in the US for plotting to kill a Swedish cartoonist who satirised the prophet Mohammed 
in 2009.
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More recently, Frenchwoman Hayat Boumeddine came to international attention after her husband, Amedy 
Coulibaly, killed a policewoman and four people in a Parisian kosher grocery store in an attack allegedly coordinated 
with the Charlie Hebdo gunmen. Boumeddine, believed to now be in Syria, recently featured in a French language 
ISIL propaganda magazine praising the actions of her husband and calling for others to join her (Drury 2015).
A new target audience
Sophisticated and targeted recruitment campaigns developed by groups such as ISIL are a major factor in the 
movement of radicalised Western women to the Middle East. Mia Bloom, author of Bombshell: women and terrorism, 
notes that ISIL and similar groups attract women and girls through social media platforms, including Facebook, 
Twitter and Tumblr.
Bloom explains that women such as Aqsa Mahmood, a 20-year-old Briton who travelled to Syria in 2013, and 
21-year-old Australian Zehra Duman, widow of Mahmoud Abdullatif and family friend of Khaled Sharrouf, have 
become spokeswomen in ISIL’s recruitment campaigns. They use social media to entice vulnerable Muslim women 
with tales of a utopian existence and spiritual rewards (Bloom 2014).
Duman has painted a romanticised picture of life in the Islamic State that reflects the descriptions of male recruits. 
Despite being widowed, she took to the internet to celebrate her husband’s ‘martyrdom’ and to ask others to make 
the same sacrifice. She also posts pictures of herself and other women clad in full Islamic dress and brandishing AK-
47s. In one photo, Duman and three other women pose on top of a new BMW (Thackray 2015).
According to one commentator, the online ‘peer-to-peer … girl-to-girl’ accounts of women such as Aqsa Mahmood 
and Zehra Duman have created a ‘jihadi girl power subculture’, in which becoming a ‘Caliphette’ is empowering 
(Pandith & Havelicek 2015).
The motivations of women who pledge allegiance to groups such as ISIL vary. Like their male counterparts, some do 
so out of a desire for adventure, while others are motivated by a sense of inequality, alienation or Islamic duty.
A report by the UK-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue suggests that there are three primary reasons driving 
women to travel to Syria and Iraq to join groups such as ISIL. The first is the belief that Muslims across the world are 
oppressed by non-believers. Traveling to Syria and Iraq to join the newly created caliphate allows these women to 
join a society which, according to their ideology, is in direct contrast to the ‘oppressive’ West. The second rationale 
put forward is the belief that in joining the caliphate they are part of establishing an ‘ideologically pure state’, and 
by fulfilling a female role—as mother, nurse or teacher—they can also contribute to the state-building effort. The 
final motivation is the belief that there’s a religious duty to support the caliphate; in return, a place in heaven is 
guaranteed (Hoyle et al. 2015).
The key role for women in the Islamic State is as caregivers. As a result, most women travelling to Syria and Iraq 
marry fighters, if they haven’t done so already, and quickly take up domestic roles. A document released this year 
by one of ISIL’s media arms, titled Women of the Islamic State: a manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade, 
confirms the primarily domestic role of women in the caliphate. The main emphasis of the manifesto is on motherly 
duties and familial support (Al-Khanssaa Brigade n.d.).
Not all women take up purely domestic roles, at least not initially. In a seemingly unusual step for ISIL, the all-female 
armed Al-Khanssaa Brigade has been established in the stronghold of Raqqah. The brigade is made up of single 
women aged between 18 and 25 and is thought to include a high number of Western women. Its role is to enforce 
sharia law dress codes and perform searches of women at checkpoints. The brigade also conducts patrols, looking 
out for inappropriate mixing of men and women or engagement with Western culture.
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#Al-Australi—networked radicalisation
Internet penetration in Australia has reached 89.92%, meaning that a vast majority of citizens can access the 
benefits that this brings. However, they can also access the sophisticated propaganda materials that terrorist 
groups such as ISIL create. Direct conversations with frontline fighters in Syria and Iraq, recruiters and facilitators 
are a keystroke away. This means that individuals can connect to the battlefield from their bedrooms and become 
involved in the fighting more easily than at any previous point in history.
We shouldn’t be surprised that extremist groups have adopted the internet as a key avenue for their messages and 
recruitment, as it reflects broader adoption of the online environment by all. The challenge for governments is to set 
the right balance of control, enforcement and enablement online.
What’s clear is that Australia has found itself in a similar position to many other Western nations, in that ISIL 
propaganda is reaching a wide audience within its borders and is inspiring individuals to travel to Syria and Iraq and 
plan attacks within Australia. The government’s struggling to understand the role that ISIL’s online propaganda is 
playing in the radicalisation of young Australians and how to counter it.
Online radicalisation—what do we know?
In the past 15 years, a great deal of research has been conducted to understand radicalisation, and various schools 
of thought have emerged about the key factors driving individuals to radicalise to the point of using violence. That 
research concludes that there are a range of global, sociological and political drivers that will influence someone 
to become involved in those activities, all of which matter just as much as ideological and psychological drivers 
(EGVR 2008).
Most of those who have become radicalised have had some vulnerability in their lives that made them receptive 
to extremist ideology. For most, radicalisation tends to take a long time, yet there’s potential for more rapid 
radicalisation with the level of propaganda that’s now available online. The key vulnerabilities making people more 
open to extremist ideology include the experience of migration to a country where the person faces marginalisation 
and racism; a serious criminal past; religious misunderstanding and naivety; failure to find anything but low-level 
employment, despite holding degrees; and travelling abroad and having direct contact with extremist networks.
That’s not to remove blame from the individual who becomes involved in terrorist activity; people make choices 
and have to face the consequences. But a common feature in most cases of radicalisation is the presence of 
an influential individual or group—a radicalisation ‘broker’—that assists and guides the individual towards a 
certain path. Involvement with such a group can provide a purpose and a sense of belonging to something bigger 
than oneself.
What does current research tell us about the role that the online environment plays in an individual’s radicalisation? 
Work by von Behr et al. (2013) examined the radicalisation process for 15 subjects and reflected broader conclusions 
from academic study of the issue over the past 10 years:
• The internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised. It enhances opportunities to become radicalised 
because it’s available to many people and enables connections with like-minded people across the world, 24/7.
• It acts as an ‘echo chamber’, tending to confirm existing beliefs.
• It not only facilitates radicalisation but accelerates the process.
• It doesn’t substitute but complements physical meetings.
• The idea of ‘self-radicalisation’ online is misleading. The presence of other influential individuals, either online or 
in person, is needed.
While the internet plays a role in making available a range of material and exposure to those who facilitate a person’s 
journey into a terrorist group, that journey doesn’t take place in isolation from their interactions in the physical 
world. Those interactions are most critical in the person’s pathway to radicalisation.
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Online Australia
The Australian Government is no different from other governments that must counter a recruitment drive by a 
technologically savvy group that manipulates its narrative and medium to suit its audience. We’ve reached a new 
stage in the evolution of modern jihadist propaganda. ISIL members who’ve grown up with technology are adept at 
using the entire range of disseminating tools at their disposal. JustPaste is used to publish summaries of battles that 
have taken place, SoundCloud to release audio reports of activities, WhatsApp and Kik Messenger to communicate 
and send images and videos, and Instagram, Facebook and Twitter to share images, propaganda and messages 
from the front lines. ISIL even uses Q&A sessions about joining the group on Ask.FM. Its messages are tailored to 
its audience, and change depending on whether they are intended for a local audience or for would-be Western 
recruits. The message is aimed to permeate deeply online to make it available to as many as possible in order to 
maintain a steady stream of recruits. ISIL’s online recruitment campaign is about the quantity of recruits rather than 
their quality.
As of March 2015, Facebook had some 1.441 billion active user accounts, and Twitter had 288 million (Statistica 
2015). Within Australia, it’s thought that 14 million people (58.8% of the total population) have Facebook accounts, 
13.7 million have YouTube accounts (57.6%) and 2.8 million have Twitter accounts (11.8%); 58% of the total Australian 
population use a social media platform of some kind (FRANk 2015). ISIL and its supporters are estimated by the 
Australian Government to create over 100,000 new posts a day on Twitter (News.com.au 2015a).
In the 54 Australian cases that have been examined for this research, 79.6% had some form of social media presence 
that showed a link to Islamist extremist beliefs, and at the very least had a degree of online literacy. Most social 
media users are under the age of 35, and the 54 cases examined for this research have an average age of just over 25, 
so it’s unsurprising that so many had a social media component. We are dealing with people who are far more active 
in social media networks than the average Australian. Any responses to counter extremism must directly tackle this 
challenge online, as well as in the physical world.
Examining the social media platforms that are being used, we found that 59.3% of those researched in our study 
had Facebook accounts, which is fractionally higher than average for Australia. Yet 27.8% of the sample had Twitter 
accounts, which is more than twice as high as the 11.4% average for Australia. This indicates the importance of this 
platform for those who are becoming radicalised or who are involved in extremist activity, and most importantly 
reflects the way ISIL is disseminating its information. 
Figure 3:  Social media usage
27.8% 11.4% 59.3% 58.4%
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These figures reflect only the social media profiles that are available from open sources. It’s likely that a great deal 
of interaction online takes place on platforms that are largely untraceable. This problem will grow as increasing 
numbers of online service providers begin rolling out encrypted email and messaging services as standard for their 
increasingly privacy-focused customer base. There’s also increasing evidence of moves by ISIL to use the Darknet 
and anonymised browsing software such as Tor to connect and communicate (Starr & Crawford 2015). ISIL advises 
supporters not to tweet names or locations or post identifiable pictures of individuals, and provides instructions on 
how to avoid detection online and how to wipe metadata from content placed online. Manuals have been published 
in Arabic and English to this end (Jones 2014, Tharoor 2015).
While we know that ISIL is quick to exploit any online advantage we do not fully understand what role the online 
environment played in radicalising Australians. Social media profiles can point to changes in attitudes and beliefs 
such as in the case of Amira Karroum, who moved from posting on Facebook about buying Prada sunglasses and 
working at a Sea World resort in her teenage years, to writing ‘the blood of a martyr does not dry’ in later posts 
(Olding 2014a). Jake Bilardi’s case gives us a valuable insight. An intelligent young man who researched international 
political issues, conflicts and ideologies, he documented his process of radicalisation on his online blog in a post 
called ‘From Melbourne to Ramadi: My Journey’. It indicates that most of his research on international affairs was 
conducted online, and outlines his use of the internet to establish contacts with violent Islamist groups: 
My main interest though was the mujahideen in the land of Sham, I found myself drawn to Jabhat al-Nusra and 
Ahrar al-Sham…I was eager to make hijra and join either of these two organisations. Despite my eagerness 
though, I met one key roadblock, how was I to get in? I had no contacts to assist me. After failed attempts at 
finding a contact I gave up all hope of making hijra…It was my conversations with brothers from the [Islamic] 
State online though that began getting me to question my view of the organisation and the stories I had heard 
about it…. I now had the determination to finally remove myself from this land. I continued my search for a 
contact, even at one point considering simply crossing the border alone without any assistance. Finally, I made 
contact with a brother online who promised to bring me across the border, it was a risky decision to trust 
someone online but I was desperate to leave and was confident the brother was genuine. 
His story did not include other events taking place in his life during this time, namely the death of his mother in 
2012 which appears to have triggered him becoming more removed from his peers and family, or his time attending 
two suburban Melbourne mosques after converting to Islam. Bilardi’s case illustrates how the internet can 
become a valuable tool to re-enforce beliefs and assumptions without peer challenge to those ideas. His case also 
demonstrates how an individual can move from exploring extremist beliefs online to actively making connections 
that facilitate joining such groups. Bilardi would have found it much harder to join ISIL without the facilitation of 
‘brothers online’. 
More research is needed to explore how individuals use the internet to radicalise, the impact of content and the role 
it plays in pathways to radicalisation. We also need to know what role the internet can play in stopping that journey 
and in bringing people back from advocating violent ideologies.
Australians in ISIL propaganda
A trend in late 2014 and 2015 is for Australians to be used in ISIL recruitment videos. Neil Prakash, Abdullah Elmir, 
Abu Yahya ash Shami, Abu Nour al-Iraqi, Tareq Kamleh and Jake Bilardi were all involved in ISIL propaganda aiming 
to attract Australians to the conflict. Foreign fighters are prized, because they are a powerful tool for recruitment 
and for showing that ISIL can appeal to a wide range of backgrounds, making it seem like a pathway worth following 
for a broad cross-section of society.
Also of note are the indirect roles that individuals can play on social media platforms. As a recent International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence report outlined, the online propagandising of individuals 
‘can be seen as lending support, encouragement, justification and religious legitimacy for the decision of some 
to join the Syrian conflict as fighters’ (Carter et al. 2014). Researchers named Robert (Musa) Cerantonio as one of 
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the two most popular online authorities in relation to this activity (Carter et al. 2014). There are also ‘cheerleaders’ 
or disseminators, often referred to as ‘ISIL Fanboys’, who support the group online and play a role in the wide 
dissemination of the ideology shaping ISIL’s online image. In April 2014, Tahmid Mirza’s Twitter account was named 
in the top 10 ‘disseminators’ of propaganda followed by English-speaking foreign fighters. The report said the 
account was followed by 48.6% of the 190 foreign fighters it had studied online (Carter et al. 2014). When Mirza was 
contacted about this by The Australian in October 2014, he explained that he had changed his position and no longer 
supported ISIL or violent jihad (Stewart and Schliebs 2014). Although it’s recently been removed, the Twitter account 
of Australi Witness was used to distribute not only information pertaining to ISIL’s propaganda, but also information 
on potential targets. Before the account was taken down, the person using it was found to be in communication 
with Elton Simpson, the man recently shot dead in Garland, Texas, during an attack on the American Freedom 
Defense Initiative’s Mohammed cartoon competition.
The response
Governments face considerable difficulty in countering an online narrative that is dispersed so quickly and is alluring 
to a small, self-selecting group of people. This was demonstrated in the UK crackdown on Twitter in the wake of 
ISIL’s execution of American journalist James Foley. The crackdown drove extremists onto other platforms, as they 
began using Diaspora, a largely untraceable social media platform. If the ideological narrative is not confronted 
skilfully, ISIL and like-minded groups will keep the advantage online. What should governments do?
The US State Department has opened a department-branded YouTube channel, which hosts videos that accuse 
ISIL of hypocrisy and war crimes against Muslims. This operates alongside a Twitter account and Facebook page 
linking stories and pictures of atrocities committed by ISIL against women and children. The State Department is 
fighting an uphill battle: while its Twitter feed boasted 7,400 followers in June 2015, the feeds of those involved in 
the fighting often have more than 10,000, and there are many of them. Governments will find it difficult to reach 
the people that they need to, because such people often dismiss government-generated content as not credible. 
What governments can do is ensure that their agencies and political leaders are using consistent language and that 
their policies back-up their public statements. Better coordination of government messaging would be a step in the 
right direction.
As Roslyn Richardson found in her November 2013 ASPI report, Fighting fire with fire: target audience responses 
to online anti-violence campaigns, governments aren’t the best source to offer compelling counter-narratives, 
but they can help build the online capacity of influential voices in the most affected communities. Governments 
should learn from Silicon Valley and other centres of technological innovation, and to benefit from their 
experience communicating with young audiences. We should bring those lessons and companies into contact with 
local communities.
Tech firms can teach communities skills enabling those with counter-narratives to go online and engage with 
radicalisers and their targets. There may be many within our communities able to develop potent counter-narratives 
to ISIL and other extremist groups, but don’t have the capacity to promote that message to a wider audience. 
Governments and the private sector can assist in providing the skills needed for natural community influencers 
to emerge.
This is happening overseas. For example, Imamsonline.com was created to act as an online portal, voice and 
information source for prospective Islamic leaders, imams and broader society. It recently began publishing a 
magazine, Haqiqah (Arabic for ‘reality’), to try to counter ISIL’s online propaganda (Warraich n.d.). The magazine 
features articles by scholars detailing how ISIL’s caliphate is illegitimate and how there’s no basis in Islamic texts for 
the group’s jihad. This work has been supported by Twitter, Facebook and Google in order to facilitate the widest 
possible distribution of the key messages in the text (Dean 2015).
Allowing effective counter-narratives to emerge will, at times, require the use of voices that are controversial and 
may have been involved in some form of extremist activity in the past. Such people are prime agents for delivering 
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messages that challenge dangerous narratives, as they have direct experience of being on the receiving end of those 
narratives. One example is the individual who created Abdullah-X (n.d.), an online cartoon character used to directly 
challenge the message of ISIL. It’s the brainchild of a former extremist who once followed the teachings of notorious 
clerics Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri—both of whom are clearly not good role models. However, the individual who 
created the character understands personally the journey that impressionable young men and women may be on, 
giving them credibility in the eyes of those toying with extremist ideas. 
Giving evidence before the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Mubin Shaikh, a former extremist jihadist 
who deradicalised and worked for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, provided an insight into how the 
online environment could be used to counter extremist propaganda:
I can say that for almost 2 years following my recruitment by the Service, I conducted several infiltration 
operations both online and on the ground involving religious extremists. … In addition, I have spent the past 
few years on Twitter having watched the very start of the Foreign Fighter phenomenon and directly observed 
recruitment and propaganda by ISIL types online I have directly engaged with many of them – some of whom 
are now deceased – male and female as well as some of their victims that they have tried to recruit. My approach 
is to show how wrong they are and to criticize and delegitimize them from the very Islamic sources that they 
misquote and mutilate (Shaikh 2015).
The picture of online radicalisation in Australia is similar to other Western nations, but our geographical location 
offers a more powerful demonstration of the enabling role the internet can play. Being some 12,000 kilometres 
from Syria and Iraq makes the physical journey that aspiring Australians have to make one of the longest of their 
foreign fighter peers. This re-enforces the importance of the role of the online environment which has meant that 
the tyranny of distance is no more and that the philosophical journey, and the tools and knowledge required to 
make the trip, are just a ‘click’ away. While not isolated from other ‘real’ world factors which influence an individuals’ 
pathway to radicalisation, the fact that 79.6% of our 54 cases researched had a social media presence, demonstrates 
the important role these platforms play in connecting ideas, propaganda, conversations and contacts. Governments 
need to put more priority on increasing our understanding of how individuals interact with these platforms 
while radicalising.
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Profiles
Australia’s Gen Y foreign fighters
Mahmoud Abdullatif
Other names: Abu Jihad, the Playboy Jihadist.
Date of death: 19 January 2015.
Approximate age at death: 23.
Residential location in Australia: Coburg, Melbourne.
Travel history: Travelled to Syria in September 2014 with Suhan Rahman, where he met with Mohammed Elomar and 
Khaled Sharrouf.
Education: Abdullatif was expelled from Brunswick Secondary School in Year 11 for failing class and causing damage 
to a neighbouring school (Olding 2015a).
Religious organisations attended: Unknown.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Known associations with individuals of significance: Suhan Rahman, Mohammed Elomar, Khaled Sharrouf 
(Olding 2015a).
Online activity: Reported to have had Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts that he used while fighting in Syria 
(Shliebs 2014).
Mohammed Ali Baryalei
Other names: Abu Omar.
Date of death: October 2014.
Approximate age at death: 33.
Residential location in Australia: Sydney.
Travel history: Baryalei left Afghanistan in 1981 with his family and arrived in Australia as a refugee seven years later. 
He travelled in April 2013 to Syria in order to fight for Jabhat al-Nusra (he changed allegiance to ISIL within two 
months of arriving) (Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2014c).
Education: Reported to have attended Catholic schools including Sydney’s Terra Sancta Catholic College 
(Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2014c). 
Religious organisations attended: Street Dawah.
Known associations with organisations abroad: Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: Omarjan Azari, Tyler Casey, Amira Karroum, Khaled Sharrouf, Mohamed 
Elomar, Abu Salayman and other unnamed foreign fighter recruits.
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Online activity: No known personal social media accounts. Baryalei featured in Street Dawah YouTube clips and he is 
reported to have requested that Omarjan Azari post a video online of the execution of ‘any random unbeliever’ from 
the Sydney streets, and that the act take place in front of an Islamic State flag (Hall 2015).
Jake Bilardi
Other names: Jihadi Jake, Abu Abdullah al-Australi.
Date of death: 11 March 2015.
Approximate age at death: 18.
Residential location in Australia: Craigieburn, Melbourne.
Travel history: Travelled to Iraq in August 2014 to fight with ISIL.
Education: Attended Craigieburn South Primary School and Craigieburn Secondary College. He dropped out of 
Niddrie’s Rosehill Secondary College in 2014 (Spooner et al. 2015).
Religious organisations attended: Hume Islamic Youth Centre, Meadow Heights Mosque.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: Unknown.
Online activity: Bilardi published a 4,300-word manifesto describing his path to radicalisation. The blog was 
published under his ISIL name, Abu Abdullah al-Australi (Alfred 2015). His alleged Twitter account also sent tweets to 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) about the Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney.
Tyler Casey
Other names: Yusuf Ali.
Date of death: 11 January 2014.
Approximate age at death: 22.
Residential location in Australia: Redcliffe, north of Brisbane.
Travel history: Casey travelled between Australia and the US during his youth. During an interview with the ABC, 
Casey’s half-brother Josiah Turnbull claimed Casey has travelled frequently overseas under the pretence of being a 
missionary in his later years. During this interview it’s also claimed the CIA and FBI had intelligence that Casey had 
trained with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2014b).
Religious organisations attended: Street Dawah.
Known associations with organisations abroad: Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda.
Individual associations of significance: Amira Karroum, Mohammed Ali Baryalei, Hamdi al Qudsi.
Online activity: Casey was an active Facebook user (Olding 2014a).
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Adam Dahman
Other names: Abu Bakr al Australi.
Date of death: 17 July 2014.
Approximate age at death: 18.
Residential location in Australia: Northcote, Melbourne.
Travel history: Travelled from Sydney or Perth initially, before travelling to Syria and then to Iraq.
Education: Attended Northcote High School; was supposed to graduate in 2013.
Religious organisations attended: Hume Islamic Youth Centre.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: Ezzit Raad and Ahmad Raad, who was Dahman’s brother-in-law.
Online activity: Dahman is known to have had a Facebook account that he used while in Syria (White et al. 2014).
Mohamed Elomar
Other names: Abuhafs al Australi.
Date of death: 22 June 2015
Approximate age at death: 30.
Residential location in Australia: Western Sydney.
Travel history: In 2013, he travelled to Syria, via Malaysia and Turkey, to join ISIL. He met his friend Khaled Sharrouf 
in Malaysia.
Education: Known to have received a boxing scholarship at the Australian Institute of Sport.
Religious organisations attended: Global Islamic Youth Centre, Liverpool.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: Khaled Sharrouf, Mohamed Ali Elomar Snr, Fatima Elomar.
Online activity: Elomar had multiple Facebook and Twitter accounts shut down. Most of his social media friends have 
been ISIL supporters, mostly located in Sydney. He loudly supported the Lindt Cafe siege on Twitter. He was also 
infamous for posting shocking images on his Twitter account. 
Amira Karroum
Other names: Squid.
Date of death: 11 January 2014.
Approximate age at death: 22.
Residential location in Australia: Granville, Sydney.
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Travel history: In December 2013, Karroum travelled to join her husband in Syria, where they were killed shortly after 
her arrival.
Education: Attended St Hilda’s Anglican girls school on the Gold Coast, despite her Muslim upbringing. She 
graduated in 2009 and went on to study graphic design.
Religious organisations attended: Masjid Al Noor mosque, Granville.
Known associations with organisations abroad: Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda.
Individual associations of significance: Tyler Casey.
Online activity: Karroum’s radicalisation process over the two years before her death is clear from her Facebook 
page. Her final posts describe paradise as her goal and her motive. She stated that ‘everything is temporary’ shortly 
before leaving for Syria, along with ‘May Allah make us the generation that will raise the flag of Islam’. She also stated 
that she was proud of being a Muslim on 11 September 2011, the 10th anniversary of 9/11.
Tareq Kamleh
Other names: Abu Yousef Al-Australie.
Approximate age (at date of publication): 29.
Country of birth: Australia.
Residential location in Australia: Subiaco, Perth.
Travel history: Travelled to Syria in April 2015. His earlier travel history is unclear, but it’s been reported that he 
originally stated that he was going to Syria to work with Doctors Without Borders.
Education: Graduated from medical school at Adelaide University in 2010.
Religious organisations attended: None known. While his mother, who is a convert, is reported to be a strict Muslim, 
there are conflicting reports about his devoutness. He’s reported as both a womaniser and a practising Muslim and 
appears to have been torn between a hedonistic lifestyle and his religious beliefs.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: None known.
Online activity: Kamleh used JustPaste.it and Facebook to publicly post his response to the Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulation Agency. His post also referred to media speculation about his radicalisation and journey to 
join ISIL (Kamleh 2015). Kamleh has also been actively involved in ISIL’s online propaganda.
Mostafa Mahamed
Other names: Abu Sulayman al Muhajir.
Approximate age (at date of publication): 30.
Residential location in Australia: Sydney.
Travel history: Travelled to Syria in 2013.
Religious organisations attended: al-Risalah Islamic Centre – Sulayman was a speaker at the al-Risalah Islamic Centre 
in Sydney.
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Known associations with organisations abroad: Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda.
Individual associations of significance: He’s been threatened by Mohamed Elomar and Khaled Sharrouf. Bilal Khazal, 
a jailed preacher from Sydney, is one of his colleagues. He has been compared to Anwar al Awlaki.
Online activity: Jabhat al-Nusra named his Twitter account one of their top three official accounts. He appeared in 
a Jabhat al-Nusra propaganda video in March 2014 and is also considered the most important English-speaking 
person to officially address the conflict between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL. His Twitter feed reportedly had around 
7,000 followers in March 2014, when the video was released (Joscelyn 2014).
Neil Prakash
Other names: Abu Khaled al-Cambodi.
Approximate age (at date of publication): 23.
Residential location in Australia: Melbourne.
Travel history: Claims to have converted to Islam after travelling to Cambodia with family in 2012. Travelled to Syria in 
September 2013.
Education: Prakash reportedly dropped out of school in Year 10 (Maley 2015). He enrolled in a number of 
TAFE courses.
Religious organisations attended: al-Furqan Islamic Information Centre.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: Mohammad Ali Baryalei.
Online activity: Prakash has used Twitter and Ask.fm to promote ISIL propaganda and create connections with 
foreign radicals. He has appeared in official ISIL propaganda video clips.
Suhan Rahman
Other names: Abu Jihad.
Date of death: 18 March 2015.
Approximate age at death: 23.
Residential location in Australia: Roxburgh Park, Melbourne.
Travel history: Travelled to Syria in September 2014 with Mahmoud Abdullatif, where he met with Mohammed 
Elomar and Khaled Sharrouf.
Education: Studied building management at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.
Religious organisations attended: Unknown. 
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL. 
Individual associations of significance’: Mahmoud Abdullatif, Mohammed Elomar, Khaled Sharrouf.
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Online activity: Rahman was active on Twitter and Facebook. He used Twitter to support the Charlie Hebdo attacks 
and used Facebook to send a series of messages to Fairfax Media expressing support for Islamic State.
Khaled Sharrouf
Other names: Abu Zarqawi.
Date of death: 22 June 2015.
Approximate age at death: 33.
Residential location in Australia: Wiley Park, western Sydney.
Travel history: Sharrouf travelled to Syria in late 2013 via Malaysia and Turkey, using his brother’s passport, to 
join ISIL.
Education: Chester Hill High School—expelled in Year 9 for bashing another student.
Religious organisations attended: al-Risalah Islamic Centre, Bankstown; Global Islamic Youth Centre, Liverpool.
Known associations with organisations abroad: ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: Mohamed Elomar, Mohamed Ali Elomar Snr, Mohammad Ali Baryalei.
Online activity: Sharrouf maintained an extensive social media presence while fighting with ISIL in Syria. In August 
2014, he posted a photo of his son holding up the severed head of a Syrian soldier. Sharrouf also taunted the AFP via 
Twitter upon his arrival in Syria.
Ahmed Succarieh
Other names: Abu Asma al Australi.
Date of death: September 2013.
Approximate age at death: 26.
Residential location in Australia: Brisbane.
Travel history: Travelled to Syria before September 2013.
Education: Attended Runcorn State High School.
Religious organisations attended: Unknown.
Known associations with organisations abroad: Jabhat al-Nusra.
Individual associations of significance: Omar Succarieh and Abraham Succarieh (both his brothers).
Online activity: While Succarieh wasn’t active on social media, there is footage of his suicide bombing online 
that includes a speech by him outlining his motives for committing the act. He was Australia’s first known 
suicide bomber. 
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Australia’s domestic jihadists
Abdul Nacer Benbrika
Other names: Sheik Abu Bakr.
Approximate age (at date of publication): 54.
Status: Convicted – serving sentence.
Residential location in Australia: Dallas, Melbourne.
Travel history: Left Algeria in 1989. Arrived in Australia on a visitor’s visa with a friend who had also come from 
Algeria, and obtained work as a process worker in Campbellfield.
Education: Graduated with an aviation engineering degree, school unknown.
Religious organisations attended: Taught at the Islamic Information and Support Centre of Australia. 
Known associations with organisations abroad: Benbrika has returned to the media spotlight after rumours surface 
that he is recruiting for ISIL from prison. It’s claimed that he has more visitors than any other inmate in Victoria 
(Al-Furqan Centre 2015).
Individual associations of significance: Ahmed Raad, Ezzit Raad, Adam Dahman, Abdullah Merhi, Aimen Joud, Fadl 
Sayadi, Amer Haddara, Sheikh Omran, Abu Qatada, Khaled Cheikho, Moustafa Cheikho, Mohamed Ali Elomar, Abdul 
Rakib Hasan, Mohammed Omar Jamal.
Online activity: Authorities are worried about Benbrika’s influence on young extremists, as he is praised online as a 
‘martyr’ and a ‘king’.
Abdul Numan Haider
Other names: None.
Date of death: 23 September 2014.
Approximate age at death: 18.
Residential location in Australia: Narre Warren, Melbourne.
Travel history: Haider’s family left Afghanistan for Australia in the mid-2000s. 
Education: Lyndale Secondary College, graduating in 2013; was enrolled in electro-engineering at Dandenong TAFE 
at the time of his death.
Religious organisations attended: al-Furqan Centre in Springvale, Melbourne.
Known associations with organisations abroad: Haider drew inspiration from ISIL, but it’s unclear whether he was 
acting on the group’s behalf or of his own accord. The cancellation of his passport in September 2014 revealed 
authorities’ suspicions that he was planning to leave the country to fight with ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: He had reportedly been associating with unnamed ‘hardline Muslims’ at the 
al-Furqan Centre, but he had moved away from the group at the time of his death.
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Online activity: Haider was active on Facebook. He posted an image on Facebook of him holding up an ISIL 
flag in response to the Sydney and Melbourne terror raids. Images of members of ISIL were also on Haider’s 
Facebook account.
Man Haron Monis
Other names: Manteghi Boroujerdi, Mohammed Hassan, Sheik Haron.
Date of death: 16 December 2014.
Age at death: 50.
Residential location in Australia: Bexley North, Sydney.
Travel history: Monis left Iran in October 1996 for Australia, where he promptly sought and was granted asylum. 
After 1996, he travelled overseas on 21 separate occasions, including 10 times to Bangkok. His trips, the purposes of 
which are unknown, generally lasted less than a week (PM&C 2015a).
Education: In 1982, Monis commenced study at Tehran’s Imam Sadiq University, where he studied political science.
Religious organisations attended: No known associations, but he converted to Sunni Islam (announced on his 
webpage) in early December 2014. He was said to be ‘isolated’ from the Australian Muslim community.
Known associations with organisations abroad: None known, but he drew inspiration from ISIL.
Individual associations of significance: None known.
Online activity: Monis was active on Facebook and ran a page where he criticised Australian Government officials 
and their treatment of him.
ChAPteR 3
Jihad in the West
Australia is one of many Western countries grappling with the domestic impact of the Syrian civil war. Although 
demographic, geographical and historical differences have influenced the nature of violent Islamism and 
radicalisation in each country, Australia can draw on lessons from other Western countries’ experiences to help 
frame its response. Countries such as Denmark, France, the UK and the US have been dealing with a larger domestic 
threat from violent Islamism for over a decade.
Attacks in the West
Significant Islamist attacks since 2010 in the West have included the Toulouse and Montauban shootings, the Boston 
bombings, the killing of Lee Rigby in the UK and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. The picture that emerges over 
this period is markedly different from that in the early 2000s, when the West was rocked by 9/11 and the Madrid and 
London bombings. More recent attacks have been smaller, more ad hoc and perpetrated by people acting alone or 
with a partner, rather than by organised groups.
There is no single profile of a person likely to carry out Islamist-inspired violence. However, an examination of the 
perpetrators of attacks in the West in recent years shows three patterns of action that authorities should bear in 
mind when forming policies to address this threat. The first is that training abroad with Islamist militant groups will 
enable perpetrators to deliver more severe attacks (Hegghammer 2013). A second pattern points to connections 
between perpetrators and a facilitating social network, spiritual mentor, or both. The third pattern concerns 
individuals who have attempted and failed to travel abroad to join a militant Islamist group—perhaps having been 
blocked by authorities by withholding or withdrawing passports—who have then carried out an attack domestically.
Links to Islamist militant organisations
It’s important to consider the aims of the group that individuals are leaving to join, as this affects the likelihood of 
people returning from the group to attack in the West. ISIL has distinctly different immediate aims from al-Qaeda, 
which has focused more directly on waging jihad in the West. ISIL’s current focus is on entrenching its Sunni 
caliphate in the Middle East and North Africa. While some domestic attacks in Western countries during 2014 and 
2015 may have been inspired by ISIL, it is at times difficult to be clear of the group provided anything more than 
online encouragement.
Two attacks in the West have been solidly linked to ISIL: Mehdi Nemmouche’s attack on the Jewish Museum of 
Belgium (2014) and the siege carried out by Amedy Coulibaly at a kosher supermarket in France following the Charlie 
Hebdo shootings (2015). Martin Couture-Rouleau’s attack on Canadian Armed Forces members in a parking lot (2014) 
has also been linked to loose inspiration from ISIL. There’s speculation that Elton Simpson, one of the shooters at 
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the Mohammed drawing contest in Texas in May 2015, was linked to the group. ISIL claimed responsibility, but it’s 
unclear whether there was any two-way communication between Simpson and ISIL before the attack.
Nemmouche is the only known returned foreign fighter to carry out an attack since 2010. He joined ISIL between late 
2012 and early 2014 and is reported to have acted as a guard for the group’s hostage sites (Dickey 2014). He carried 
out his attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium shortly after returning to France. ISIL didn’t make statements about 
whether Nemmouche was a member of the group or whether ISIL was responsible for ordering the attack. Evidence 
seems to suggest that Nemmouche didn’t have the direct support of the group.
Coulibaly, who killed five people, claimed allegiance to ISIL in a video released by the group following the incident. 
He didn’t have physical contact with the group before his attack, but his wife escaped from France and has since 
been used in the group’s propaganda. Links between ISIL and Coulibaly before the attack are difficult to discern. 
It doesn’t appear that the group provided material or financial support or training, but rather that Coulibaly was 
inspired by ISIL’s meteoric rise and that the group seized the opportunity to be aligned with the perpetrator. The 
same story appears to have been repeated in the case of Simpson in Texas.
Other recent attacks show evidence of inspiration by and links to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, although this trend 
has declined with the rise of ISIL since 2014. These attacks have most notably included the Charlie Hebdo shootings 
by Cherif and Said Kouachi (2015), which were purportedly inspired and supported by AQAP. Mohamed Merah’s 
deadly shooting spree in France in 2012 also showed potential links to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. And there are the 
two cases of botched bombings in 2010 in New York and Stockholm, which were both linked to al-Qaeda. Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev, the older of the brothers behind the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, had links to Islamist groups abroad, 
although not to al-Qaeda or ISIL. He reportedly made contact with groups operating in Dagestan during a trip to 
the region in 2012. Finally, Michael Adebolajo, one of the killers of Lee Rigby in the UK (2013), attempted to join 
al-Shabaab in 2010 in Kenya but was arrested.
The Charlie Hebdo shootings figure prominently in the list of attacks. The attack was the most deadly in the 
timeframe covered here and showed the most tangible link between perpetrators and a militant Islamist group. 
Reports suggest that either one or both of the Kouachi brothers had established links with AQAP,1 had travelled to 
train with the group in Yemen and had been provided with funds by the group to carry out the attack. The brothers 
also stated their link to the group when they contacted French media while on the run from the authorities.
The training, support and inspiration gained during trips abroad can have a lasting effect, as was seen most 
clearly in the Charlie Hebdo attack. In three high-profile cases since 2010, security surveillance of the attackers 
(Cherif Kouachi, Michael Adebolajo and Mohamed Merah) was ended shortly before the attacks, even though the 
perpetrators had previously travelled abroad with the intent of linking up with a militant Islamist group.
Recent attacks suggest that those who have trained abroad or travelled abroad with the intent of gaining training 
and support for a domestic attack may prove a more serious threat than those who have travelled abroad to fight in 
a civil conflict. This speaks to the importance of understanding the aims and ideology of groups operating abroad 
and the motives of those travelling to join them.
The organisational structure, aims and motives of ISIL currently suggest that its focus isn’t on conducting attacks in 
the West, although it’s happy to gain further notoriety by aligning itself with the perpetrators of fresh attacks.
Facilitating networks and mentors
Individuals’ links to facilitating networks also appear to affect their decisions to carry out domestic attacks. Those 
links can occur in local communities or online. A connection to a spiritual mentor who advocates attacks in the West 
1 Initial reports based on Yemeni intelligence and Said’s travel history stated that he had travelled to Yemen. However, his 
wife (who has no proven links to the attack or extreme Islamist elements in Paris) has stated adamantly that he couldn’t 
have gone to Yemen at the time authorities argued he had, as she was heavily pregnant and he didn’t leave her for more than 
three days in that period. It’s therefore been suggested that Cherif Kouachi may have travelled using his brother’s passport. 
There have also been claims in the media that both brothers travelled to Yemen to meet with AQAP.
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is important. This connection can be one-sided (for example, the perpetrator might watch online sermons by a 
prominent extremist preacher, but not be in direct contact with the preacher). While the term ‘lone wolf’ has gained 
traction in media reports about recent cases of violent Islamism in Western countries, probably because of the trend 
towards attackers operating alone, it gives the false impression that radicalisation and the planning of attacks occur 
in isolation.
Cherif Kouachi, Tamerlan Tsarnaev and the killers of Lee Rigby were linked to radical Islamist elements within their 
communities. Adebolajo was closely associated with the now banned anti-military Islamic group al-Muhajiroun 
in the UK. It’s also believed that other Britons travelling to Kenya around 2010, such as Adebolajo, had links to the 
group (Peachy et al. 2013). Cherif Kouachi was part of an elaborate network of Islamist extremists in Paris, which he 
developed through his attendance at the Addawa mosque and then his time in prison. Finally, Tamerlan Tsarnaev 
attended the Islamic Society of Boston, which has been alleged by reporter Oren Dorell (2013) to support a brand 
of Islam that encourages grievance against the West. He also became involved in Islamist organisations via his 
family connections in Dagestan during his travels there (Shuster 2013). While links with organisations and groups 
that espouse radical interpretations of Islam probably come after initial engagement with extremist ideology, social 
connections that allow individuals to openly express their beliefs and find support and encouragement fuel and 
sustain radicalisation and may encourage attacks.
Several other recent attacks have shown that physical connections to radical Islamist groups or to a local facilitating 
network aren’t necessary to engage with extreme ideology. That Anwar al-Awlaki was a radicalising online force 
for many perpetrators is testament to the capacity of charismatic individuals to create mentor-like roles online to 
inspire vulnerable people to carry out attacks. Al-Awlaki is considered to have helped motivate Faisal Shahzad, 
Roshonara Choudry, the Tsarnaev brothers and the Kouachi brothers in their attacks. AQAP’s Inspire magazine 
continues to be identified as a radicalising force in recent attacks.
Failure to launch
At least five perpetrators of attacks since 2010 attempted but failed to travel abroad to join or link up with Islamist 
militant groups. In each case, authorities halted their plans. Canada experienced two attacks in short succession in 
late 2014 by perpetrators who had both previously attempted or expressed an intention to travel abroad to join ISIL. 
Couture-Rouleau attempted to travel to Turkey in mid-2014, to then join ISIL in Syria and Iraq. He was stopped at the 
airport by authorities and his passport was seized (Payton 2014). Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who attacked the Canadian 
Parliament two days later, had expressed his intention to travel to Syria prior to the attack. He had applied for a 
passport, purportedly to travel to join ISIL, but it had been held up. Other perpetrators who tried but failed to travel 
abroad included Cherif Kouachi,2 Adebolajo and Simpson.
Western foreign fighters
In February 2015, Vice Admiral David Johnston, the ADF’s Chief of Joint Operations, stated that ISIL had between 
20,000 and 31,500 available fighters (Johnston 2015). A study of Western foreign fighters by King’s College London 
estimated that 20,730 foreign fighters had mobilised as at 26 January 2015 (Neumann 2015). Most are Sunni Islamist 
militants, while some have joined Shiite and Kurdish militias. Officials from the US National Counterterrorism Center 
estimated foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq to have come from 90 countries (Bora 2015). 11,000 of those foreign 
fighters are thought to hail from the Middle East, and 3,000 are believed to be from countries that comprised the 
former USSR. 4,406 are understood to be from Western countries, including nearly 4,000 from Western Europe 
(Table 3). Up to one-third of the 20,730 foreigners mobilised over the years of fighting are thought to have returned 
to their home countries; another 5%–10% are estimated to have been killed in theatre (Neumann 2015).
2 Cherif Kouachi tried to travel to Iraq in 2005 to fight but was stopped and put into jail in France, as such travel was an offence 
at the time. It appears that he may have succeeded in travelling to Yemen to train in 2011 for the Charlie Hebdo attack along 
with his brother, although this remains unclear.
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Not only are France, Germany and the UK the largest countries in the European Union by population, they’ve also 
contributed the greatest numbers of foreign fighters to the conflict in Syria and Iraq. The problem is much more 
acute on a per capita basis in Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, which have contributed a disproportionately large 
number of fighters. Peter Neumann suggests that peer-to-peer relations and community networks are primary 
motivators and means of recruitment to ISIL. He notes that this can lead to a clustering effect as seen in Norway, 
where ‘almost all of [the country’s] recruits had left from not only the same town, but the same street’ (Liddy & 
Gourlay 2015).
Table 3:  Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq
Country Estimated number of foreign 
fighters (upper figure)
Range (where indicated) Per capita (up to; per 
million population)
Austria 150 100–150 17
Belgium 440 – 40
Denmark 150 100–150 27
Finland 70 50–70 13
France 1,200 – 18
Germany 600 500–600 7.5
Ireland 30 – 7
Italy 80 – 1.5
Netherlands 250 200–250 14.5
Norway 60 – 12
Spain 100 50–100 2
Sweden 180 150–180 19
Switzerland 40 – 5
United Kingdom 600 500–600 9.5
Australia 250 100–250 –
New Zealand 6 – –
US 100 – –
Canada 100 – –
Total 4,406 – –
 
Source: Neumann (2015).
The responses
In seeking to address the phenomenon of foreign fighters, Western governments have been motivated by two 
primary concerns: first, that the behaviour of foreign fighters joining the conflict will ‘accentuate its duration, 
sectarian nature and barbarity’ (Vidino et al. 2014); second, that foreign fighters will use their contacts, training 
and radical ideology to carry out attacks in their home country once they’ve returned. A variety of policy responses 
have been deployed to address this difficult issue. They fall into two broad categories: the punitive, encompassing 
criminal and administrative measures; and the preventive (or rehabilitative), employing so-called ‘softer’ 
counter-radicalisation approaches.
As extremist activity in Syria and Iraq gained traction and Western attention through mid-2014, the flow of 
foreign fighters became a significant concern to many nations. On 24 September 2014, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 2178, compelling member states to take action to address the threat posed by foreign fighters 
(US Government 2014). It required that domestic legislation be updated to better meet the foreign fighter challenge; 
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travelling abroad for terrorist purposes was criminalised, as was the facilitation and financing of such travel. 
Resolution 2178 also called on states to expand and improve international cooperation and information sharing, and 
recognised ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) initiatives as a core component of the response—the first time the 
Security Council had done so (US Government 2014).
Preventing departure
Western states have pursued a multilayered approach to prevent people from travelling for terrorist purposes. 
Confiscating or cancelling passports of those suspected to be planning to travel to fight in Syria and Iraq is one of the 
more tangible signs of the policy shift. Several states have pursued this approach, including New Zealand, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark, while others such as the US maintain the power to cancel 
passports. Efforts to interdict those suspected of being aspiring foreign fighters also include travel bans, short-term 
surveillance and detention. Some European jurisdictions have legal mechanisms to investigate and prosecute 
foreign fighters before their departure in certain circumstances. 
States have also sought administrative arrangements that focus on disrupting travel for terrorist purposes. In 
February, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Nicholas J Rasmussen, testified to the US Congress 
that ‘we see an increased political willingness among our foreign partners to review and enhance border controls 
and institute stronger watchlisting and information sharing arrangements’ (Rasmussen 2015). Despite such efforts, 
a significant number of foreign fighters don’t come to the attention of authorities before they travel, hampering 
global tracking and interdiction efforts. Western states, particularly those in Europe, have also put an emphasis on 
strengthening border security as a complement to effective information exchange. 
It’s also important to recognise that some states pursue policy measures that focus on preventing citizens from 
becoming foreign fighters. In Denmark, authorities engage potential recruits, alongside family members and 
community leaders, in a conversation that seeks to dissuade them from the foreign fighter route. A range of 
states have well-developed strategies and structures in place to engage with individuals, build resilience and 
ultimately seek to prevent radicalisation. They include Britain’s Prevent program and Germany’s Hayat program 
and Gefährdeansprachen (hazard talks) initiative, in which the authorities approach those suspected of planning 
terror-related travel to remind them of the implications should they follow through (Vidino et al. 2014).
Returning foreign fighters
As has been highlighted, many foreign fighters who join extremist groups such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq won’t return 
to their home countries. That’s particularly true of those from the West. As with efforts to prevent the departure of 
aspiring foreign fighters, Western states have deployed a range of criminal and administrative measures, along with 
CVE efforts.
The fundamental choice that states have to make in dealing with returned foreign fighters is whether or not to 
pursue prosecutions. Officials in the UK have the power to detain returnees from Syria for up to 14 days without 
charge. Norway has arrested returned foreign fighters. Authorities in Canada and France can ‘question, monitor 
and seek to prosecute’ returnees (Vidino et al. 2014). However all jurisdictions face the same significant challenge 
of gathering enough admissible evidence. But using the judiciary won’t prevent terrorist incidents; it’s been argued 
that prosecuting all returnees offers a ‘false sense of finality’, as jail stints are often short and sometimes do more 
harm than good when those convicted are ‘exposed to hardened jihadists and radical religious leaders’ (Byman & 
Shapiro 2014a) .
Some states have varying degrees of power to revoke the citizenship of those involved in terror activities abroad. In 
both France and Canada a dual citizen can have their citizenship revoked, at the discretion of a minister, in a limited 
range of circumstances related to terrorism or national security as determined by a court. There’s also scope in the 
US Code for the deprivation of citizenship—a process requiring judicial involvement. The United Kingdom has broad 
powers to revoke the citizenship of even sole UK citizens if the Secretary of State is satisfied that such a move is 
‘conducive to the public good’ (Pillai 2015).
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If returned foreign fighters aren’t detained and prosecuted or don’t have their citizenship revoked, the state can 
put them under surveillance with or without their knowledge. The US, for example, elects to use surveillance on 
returned foreign fighters rather than arrest them. While it’s a resource-intensive approach, it enables the state to 
gather intelligence on jihadist networks and reach out to those who aren’t a threat. Authorities in Denmark seek to 
monitor returnees in order to assess whether they pose a threat (Vidino et al. 2014:8–9).
Many jurisdictions have introduced preventive efforts aimed at disengaging and reintegrating returned foreign 
fighters through rehabilitation, religious mentoring, and counselling and careers advice. In the Danish city of Aarhus, 
officials evaluate returnees for risk, after which they can be monitored, arrested, referred for treatment or assisted 
to re-join society. The authorities have ‘specific re-training programs that aim to capitalise on the fatigue and 
disillusionment that some returnees feel and to offer them the possibility of re-integration into their home societies’ 
(Byman & Shapiro 2014b). These efforts are sometimes a complement or alternative to prosecution.
At the heart of the struggle to confront the phenomenon of foreign fighters is an understanding that there exists 
no archetype of a foreign fighter, nor is there a consensus on how best they be dealt with. The inability of Western 
nations to predict the circumstances of aspiring or returned foreign fighters requires a policy framework that’s 
flexible enough to deal with a range of contingencies, doesn’t overstate the threat and strikes the right balance 
between preventive, punitive and rehabilitative measures. In dealing with aspiring or returned foreign fighters, the 
state should assess individuals on a case-by-case basis. Authentic engagement and cooperation with local Muslim 
communities is central to meeting this challenge.
ChAPteR 4
Australia’s policy response
While the Australian Government was aware of radicalised Australians travelling to Syria since early 2012 (Irvine 
2012), it took ISIL’s dramatic expansion in 2014 and imagery showing the complicity of Australians in ISIL crimes to 
trigger a broader government response to the mounting crisis.
That response has included military intervention, new legislation, new budget funding, a significant review, and 
changes in the nation’s counterterrorism machinery. These changes have occurred in the midst of numerous 
disruption operations against plots to attack domestically, a large increase in those travelling to the Middle East, a 
siege inspired by radical Islam, and a range of other attacks in Canada, Denmark, France and the US.
This section reviews the government’s response to the jihadi threat, including modifications to the terror alert 
system, legislative change, military operations, organisational innovation, Commonwealth–state relations and 
international cooperation.
A turbulent period (selected events)
• January 2014: ISIL forces commence attacks into Anbar Province, Iraq.
• June 2014: ISIL forces extend their actions in Iraq, including in Mosul and Tikrit. A ‘caliphate’ is declared on 
29 June.
• July 2014: Graphic scenes of involvement by Australians in ISIL atrocities and bombings are shown in 
newspapers after online postings.
• 5 August 2014: The Australian Government increases funding for counterterrorism by $630 million. 
This money is to build intelligence and border control capacities, improve security at Parliament House 
and provide resources to engage people at risk of radicalisation. The government announces new 
counterterrorism legislation.
• August 14: A humanitarian mission is launched to relieve trapped Yazidis near Srinjar, Iraq.
• 12 September 2014: The Australian Government raises the national terror alert to ‘High’, in the first-ever 
revision of this alert.
• 14 September 2014: The government announces its intention to deploy 600 troops and aircraft to join 
multinational coalition against ISIL in Iraq.
• 18 September 2014: 800 police are involved in Operation Appleby raids in Sydney and Brisbane; two people 
are arrested.
• 24 September 2014: Two police officers are severely injured by an assailant with ISIL sympathies in Melbourne.
• 20 and 22 October 2014: Attacks take place in Canada.
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• September–november 2014: Two tranches of new counterterrorism laws targeting foreign fighters and 
removing some barriers to interagency coordination are introduced, debated and passed.
• 15–16 december 2014: Two people and a gunman are killed during a siege in the Lindt Cafe, Sydney.
• 24 december 2014. Two people in Sydney are arrested on terrorism-related charges.
• 9–11 January 2015: Attacks take place in Paris.
• 20 February 2015: Attorney-General Brandis announces new programs to counter terrorist propaganda and 
calls a regional summit for June 2015.
• 22 February 2015: Prime Minister Abbott makes an address on counterterrorism, announces counterterrorism 
arrangements and releases a review of the Lindt Cafe attack. ASIO is investigating 400 terrorism cases.
• 1 March 2015: An anti-terrorism package for selected schools is announced.
• 2 March 2015: Travel to Mosul in Iraq is banned.
• 3 March 2015: The government announces 300 extra soldiers for Iraq; New Zealand joins this group in April.
• 7 March 2015: Airport officials stop two Sydney teenagers from flying to the Middle East.
• March 2015: A Melbourne teenager dies as a suicide bomber in Iraq.
• 18 March 2015: A terrorist attack at a Tunisian museum takes place.
• 28 March 2015: Data retention laws are passed.
• 1 April: The Kenyan university massacre takes place.
• 18 April 2015: Five Melbourne teenagers are arrested over an alleged plot set for Anzac Day.
• 10 May 2015: 17 year old boy arrested in Melbourne, charged with plotting a terrorist attack set for Mother’s Day.
• 15 May 2015: The strategically located Iraqi city of Ramadi, 110 kilometres west of Baghdad, falls to ISIL fighters 
after a lengthy siege. 
• 26-30 May 2015: New political-level appointments and National Counter Terrorism Coordinator announced; 
Australian government flags changes to citizenship laws.
Legislative change
A mix of planned and opportunistic change
Australia’s legislative regime for counterterrorism has undergone constant refinement and expansion since 2002, to 
the point where The Economist describes it as ‘pushing the limits’ of the balance between individual freedoms and 
security (Banyan 2014).
This refinement took the form of four tranches of legislation presented and passed in late 2014 and early 2015 
(see box). The legislation was extensive: it followed the Australian Government’s generally reactive approach to 
amending or adding to counterterrorism legislation, and aimed to make it easier for agencies to disrupt plots at the 
earliest possible time. These four tranches won’t be the last word: more legislation concerning citizenship has been 
flagged for consideration in mid-2015.
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Recent counterterrorism legislation
tranche 1: National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014
(Introduced July 2014, passed both houses 1 October 2014)
This law modernises and improves the legislative framework that governs the activities of the Australian intelligence 
community, primarily the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001. 
Its provisions include new or revised laws to modernise ASIO’s employment framework, modernise and streamline 
the agency’s warrant-based intelligence collection powers, strengthen its ability to conduct covert operations, 
clarify some information-sharing powers, and increase protections for intelligence information. The Act also 
improves interagency cooperation and renames some defence agencies.
tranche 2: Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014
(Introduced 24 September 2014, passed both houses 30 October 2014)
This law creates ‘a suite of measures which are specifically designed to strengthen and improve Australia’s 
counterterrorism legislative framework to respond to the foreign fighter threat. It will provide additional powers for 
security agencies to deal with the threat of terrorism within Australia and that posed by Australians who participate 
in terrorist activities overseas.’ It includes measures to improve information sharing among agencies, introduce 
the ability to suspend passports (including suspension or cancellation without notification), change ASIO’s warrant 
powers, introduce the delayed notification warrant, lower the threshold for arrest on terrorism charges, create 
the new offense of ‘advocating terrorism’, incorporate the Foreign Incursions Act into the Crimes Act, change the 
admissibility of evidence gained from overseas sources, and add a requirement for the Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor to review a number of aspects of Australia’s counterterrorism laws. In addition, laws 
were introduced to allow welfare payments and visas to be cancelled on security grounds, and enhance the ability 
of Customs officers to detain suspects. Some older measures, including control orders and preventative detention 
orders, were extended and modified.
tranche 3: Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014
(Introduced 29 October 2014, passed both houses 2 December 2014)
This Act includes a package of amendments to the Criminal Code Act 1995 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001. 
The Act strengthens the control order regime and implements agreed changes to the ‘Foreign Fighters’ Act, 
including the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s role in listing terrorist organisations. 
Also included were specific amendments that make it a role of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) 
to provide assistance to the Australian Defence Force in support of the military operations and cooperate on 
intelligence matters.
tranche 4: Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015
(Introduced 30 October 2014, passed both houses 26 March 2015)
This Act requires telecommunications service providers to retain data (not content) prescribed by regulations for 
two years; provides for a review of the mandatory data retention scheme no more than three years after the end of 
its implementation phase; limits the range of agencies that are able to access telecommunications data and stored 
communications; provides for record-keeping and reporting the use of, and access to, telecommunications data; 
and requires the Commonwealth Ombudsman to inspect and oversee those records for compliance.
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The impacts of these new laws are starting to be seen, especially in the early disruption of some terrorist plots and 
efforts to stop travel by potential foreign fighters. Still, critics such as the Human Rights Law Centre, representatives 
of associations for Muslim lawyers and some prominent Australian legal scholars claimed that the law poses 
problems for human rights in Australia (Om 2014, HRLC 2015). Others, including highly respected Bret Walker SC, 
didn’t see the changes as necessary (ABC 2014a). The Australian Government and the Opposition, which supported 
the passage of the legislation, disagreed.
Speaking after the 2014 ‘foreign fighters’ laws came into effect, Attorney-General Brandis said, ‘The strong measures 
which we have introduced, which are subject to robust safeguards and parliamentary oversight, protect our citizens 
without jeopardising our freedoms’ (AGD 2014). The public seems generally supportive of that line. While metadata 
retention was controversial (Smith 2015), around 77% of respondents in an August 2014 Newspoll supported the 
proposal to ban travel to areas of civil war, such as Iraq or Syria (Newspoll 2014).
Aims of the legislation
This new legislation has approached the challenge of countering terrorism with three main aims in mind. The first 
priority is to facilitate a law enforcement strategy of disruption. Several measures lower the threshold for action so 
that police and security agencies can prevent terrorist plots from becoming more sophisticated and threatening. 
Measures in the 2014 package of legislation included delayed notification warrants for use in terrorism cases 
and created the new offence of ‘advocating terrorism’. The thresholds for questioning by Customs officers were 
also lowered.
A second aim of the legislative package was to redress the relative disadvantages of law enforcement when acts 
are committed outside Australia. While terrorism has a status as an international crime, evidence is still needed to 
obtain convictions. This has led to changes in the Foreign Evidence Act 1994 to broaden the sources of evidence that 
can be presented in court, and has also led to laws that allow the government to declare areas as ‘no go’ zones. 
Under this provision, a person can now be prosecuted for entering a proscribed area, unless they were there for a 
purpose listed as an exemption or defence, such as visiting family in the declared area.
The third aim has been to improve the ability of agencies to work together. The laws made explicit the ability of the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service and the ADF to work together (but didn’t extend the powers of either), gave 
the AFP an ability to share information from delayed notification warrants with specified agencies, and increased 
the number of agencies that can obtain information from Australia’s financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC. These and 
related changes are improving cooperation between agencies.
The Abbott government has recently focussed on citizenship as a new measure. In a May 2015 discussion paper, 
Australian Citizenship, Your Right, Your Responsibility the government set out options to remove citizenship from 
dual nationals:
The Government intends to modernise the Australian Citizenship Act to enable the Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection to take action in the national interest to revoke the Australian citizenship of dual citizens who 
engage in terrorism that betrays their allegiance to Australia. These powers would be used against dual citizens 
who join or support listed terrorist groups such as ISIL, or engage in terrorist acts alone. … 
The Government is also considering enabling the Minister to revoke Australian citizenship where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe the person is able to become a national of another country under their laws and 
would not be made stateless, as is the case in UK law (Australian Government 2015c). 
According to reports, this legislation could be introduced in the middle of 2015. Debate has thus far centred on 
whether Ministers or the Court system should have the powers to strip dual nationals of citizenship. The further 
possible step of removing citizenship of Australian born individuals is legally complex and likely to be hotly debated. 
The Prime Minister stated on 26 May that 40-50% of Australians fighting with terrorist groups in the Middle East 
could be dual nationals (Abbott 2015b). Of the individuals we studied just over 42.5% were reported to have been 
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born in Australia, while almost 30% were reportedly born overseas. Ascertaining citizenship status of the individuals 
is difficult through open-source material. However, Abdul Nacer Benbrika (Stewart 2015), Mehmet Biber (Olding 
2013) and Tyler Casey (Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2014a) are all reported to have held or hold dual citizenships.
A war on two fronts
The Australian Government’s military response to ISIL’s expansion from Syria into Iraq in early 2014 has been one 
of contrasts. From a purely military perspective, the response has been graduated and relatively small, although 
significant in terms of the sophisticated military capabilities deployed and the symbolism of an early and sustained 
commitment. The public explanation of that commitment, however, has been less agile. ASPI’s review, Strike from 
the air: the first 100 days of the campaign against ISIL, released in December 2014, explained Australia’s initial military 
engagement in Iraq and the challenges it faced:
Australia’s role in the international coalition is currently limited to airstrikes on targets in Iraq and an evolving 
commitment to training elements of the Iraqi security forces. Both roles are indefinitely sustainable, given the 
ADF’s capacity to rotate forces and projections of defence spending. The broader challenge for Canberra will be 
to explain how this fits into a credible international strategy with a realisable political objective.
The campaign to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained 
counterterrorism strategy’ is essentially a work in progress. ISIL’s rapid advances of mid-2014 have been 
checked, but the group has shown itself to be tough and able to adapt its tactics. In 2015, it will become apparent 
how much more can be done to degrade ISIL via airstrikes. The first half of the year will be decisive for the Iraqi 
Army in showing whether it can retake and then effectively administer territory. Including the Sunni minority, 
especially in the west and north of Iraq, and limiting Iranian influence will both be critical to subsequent phases 
of the campaign. More broadly, a credible political solution in Syria and Iraq remains elusive. The absence of an 
international interest in or commitment to tackling the region’s deep-seated political problems will constrain the 
effectiveness of the campaign against ISIL into the future.
In May 2015, there was no greater clarity about the broad direction of the military campaign. The US Department 
of Defense claimed that, as a result of coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, 6,278 ISIL targets had been damaged or 
destroyed, and that as a result:
ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once 
could. These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometres. (US DoD 2015)
Against this remarkably optimistic assessment we have to offset renewed ISIL territorial gains, including the capital 
of Iraq’s Anbar Province, Ramadi. ISIL has shown itself to be a determined force able to mount conventional style 
military operations and to prosecute military objectives under heavy fire. By contrast, Iraqi forces are struggling to 
take or hold territory, and Baghdad is increasingly turning to Iran and Iranian-backed Shia militia forces to take the 
fight to ISIL in predominantly Sunni areas.
In Syria, ISIL continues to control the city of Raqqah. In mid-May, US special operations forces successfully 
conducted a remarkable operation, killing Abu Sayyaf, an ISIL leader said to be in charge of the group’s valuable 
oil business, and capturing his wife. While this is a useful tactical gain, the direction of events in Syria points to a 
weakening of President Assad’s position and a strengthening of extremist Islamist groups, most particularly ISIL and 
Jabhat al-Nusra. There’s no credible coalition military strategy for Syria.
The Australian Foreign Minister’s visit to Tehran in April 2015 and her discussions on low-level intelligence sharing 
suggest an emerging pragmatism in our Middle Eastern diplomacy, in which we acknowledge the Shia–Sunni divide 
and seek a regional solution. The challenge facing the government is to translate these actions into a strategy that 
accounts for redefined national interests. It should go beyond operational outcomes limited to Iraq or Syria and 
develop an approach that ensures Australia’s credible contribution is a step towards a realistic and stable outcome 
in the Middle East.
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One domestic challenge that the government faces is to show how Australia’s role in the coalition addresses an 
upsurge in radicalisation domestically. ISIL’s slick propaganda machine takes advantage of its victories and defeats 
to appeal to individuals around the world. The saturation media coverage encourages the recruitment of fighters, 
women to marry fighters and bear children for the caliphate, and financial backers. In early February 2015, Defence 
Minister Kevin Andrews told the Australian media that ISIL was estimated to have 31,500 fighters—a fivefold increase 
since June 2014. In the ruthless calculations of ISIL leaders, their military losses are acceptable as long as they 
promote even faster recruitment.
The government must continue to explain the rationale behind Australia’s national interests as the situation in the 
Middle East rapidly deteriorates. A key question confronting the government now is: how will prolonged military 
stalemates in Iraq and Syria affect domestic radicalisation?
In announcing the deployment of a combined Australian and New Zealand military training unit to Iraq in April 2015, 
Prime Minister Abbott indicated that the mission would last two years. While Australia gears up for the long haul, 
it’s important to recognise that this conflict links the battlefront and Australia’s domestic heartland far more closely 
than any previous Australian military deployment. This is a war on two fronts, placing demands on our leaders 
to justify our involvement, show the connections between overseas and domestic developments and present a 
credible strategy to deal with the threat in both locations.
Changes to counter domestic terrorist threats
The Commonwealth government has responded to the evolving domestic terrorist situation since mid-2014 with 
changes including new ministerial positions and a new national-level coordinating body. In addition, additional 
units have been raised within existing organisations to either make use of existing powers, or provide support to 
new initiatives that deal with new aspects of the threat such as travel by potential ‘foreign fighters’. Importantly, 
these new arrangements have built upon an already-significant body of collaborative work that’s occurred since 
September 11 2001. 
Levels already achieved 
The report of the 2015 Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery (PM&C 2015b) describes the vast 
expansion of agencies involved in counterterrorism from 2001 to 2014. Before then, only 11 agencies were involved 
in a limited range of activities to undermine terrorist activity and disrupt attacks. Attacks were very sporadic in 
the period from 1970 to 2000, and often linked to grievances about overseas issues. Little was done to engage the 
community about terrorism.
That situation changed after the September 2001 attacks in the US. Budgets increased significantly, more agencies 
became involved, and counterterrorism efforts were extended across the entire plausible range of activities. 
A strategic preference to disrupt terrorist activity emerged, along with efforts to build community cohesion 
and resilience.
The increased attention to counterterrorism was operationalised through an expansion in the functions and 
activities of the 21 agencies now involved. While the arrangements have taken time to evolve, interagency and 
interjurisdictional cooperation in the counterterrorism space is generally described as very good today. Since 2001, 
joint counterterrorism teams have become well established, joint operations are the norm. The Australia – New 
Zealand Counterterrorism Committee (ANZCTC) has proven to be a useful and longstanding forum for practical 
multijurisdictional cooperation, including developing national counterterrorism plans and handbooks, many 
training and exercise opportunities and purchasing equipment. The committee has helped coordinate policy advice 
to governments and promoted cooperation that’s been useful in different kinds of crisis, including natural disasters.
While the ANZCTC has been a central contributor to the members’ national approaches, the efforts of the state 
and territory governments in counterterrorism have been individually and collectively important too, as they are 
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the governments most responsible for protecting the safety of people. The heightened threat has required closer 
attention, new spending and new organisations. State governments have done much work on related areas, such as 
promoting community cohesion and resilience.
The high level of national cooperation was maintained despite falling budget allocations for counterterrorism. After 
reaching a peak of $790 million per year in 2007–08, funding steadily declined to around $523 million in 2013–14. 
Areas finding their spending reduced included the ANZCTC (which lost $13.4 million over four years in 2012–13), 
the ‘building community resilience’ element of the CVE Program in the Attorney-General’s Department, which was 
discontinued after 2014–15 (it was budgeted for $7.9 million over the previous four years), and the AFP, the numbers 
of which stopped growing after the 2013 budget. At the same time, money for new functions, such as the Cyber 
Security Operations Centre, was taken from existing budget allocations.
No new counterterrorism initiatives were funded in the May 2014 Budget. However, when faced with the prospect of 
an increasing threat, the government announced a $630 million package to boost agency funding on 5 August 2014. 
This package increased intelligence resources, improved security at Parliament House, and added to border security 
with three new initiatives. On top of this, the government added another $1.2 billion in the May 2015 Budget; 
the money was allocated to continued operations in Western Asia, helping telecommunications companies to 
implement metadata retention, building new capability in the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and countering 
online terrorist propaganda.
New initiatives
The multiagency National Disruption Group was announced as a new $32.7 million initiative on 26 August 2014. The 
Daily Telegraph reported it as a ‘multi-agency group to focus on the investigation, prosecution and disruption of 
foreign fighters and their supporters’. This group, which borrows from the National Anti-Gangs Squad concept, now 
consists of Commonwealth representatives from the AFP, Customs, ASIO, the Australian Taxation Office, Centrelink 
and AUSTRAC. Liaison officers from state police forces are also involved. This coordination is important because 
there’s some concern about ‘double targeting’ of individuals by different agencies. Funding has also been provided 
for an Australian Federal Police Community Diversion and Monitoring Team ‘for returning foreign fighters and those 
who support them’ (Abbott and Brandis 2014).
Another initiative designed to help provide intelligence for the National Disruption Group and others was a ‘foreign 
fighters taskforce’ within the Australian Crime Commission, which was funded as part of the August 2014 spending 
announcement. Using a cash injection of $24 million over four years, the taskforce will use the commission’s ‘power 
to compel witnesses on pain of contempt proceedings’, according to the Prime Minister. Broadening the Australian 
Crime Commission’s mandate into terrorism was unusual: previously, this was the province of ASIO and the AFP. 
It’s clear that, despite it being illegal for a person to withhold information when being questioned by ASIO under 
warrant (under the section 34L(2–4) of the ASIO Act), the government felt it necessary to use the commission’s 
coercive powers.
The ability of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service to detect and prevent potential foreign fighters 
from travelling to the Syria–Iraq conflict was also enhanced. Part of the $150 million provided in the August 2014 
funding package was assigned to a new Border Force Counter-Terrorism Unit. In addition to allowing Customs to 
increase their visibility at airports, the unit would also provide specialist officers to detect and question potential 
foreign fighters. We’ve seen the impact of these measure since, with the head of the new Australian Border Force, Mr 
Roman Quaedvlieg, reporting that 284 passengers had been ‘offloaded’ from flights since 22 August 2014 after being 
assessed as ‘national security risks’ (Australian Senate 2015a, p. 47). 
Changes have also been made to Commonwealth coordinating arrangements and ministerial responsibilities 
for counterterrorism. As recommended in the Review of Australia’s Counterterrorism Machinery (PM&C 2015b), a 
new coordinating body has been established within PM&C to coordinate the policy aspects of Australia’s ongoing 
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response. Led by diplomat Greg Moriarty, this centre will work closely with other agencies, including state and 
territory agencies, on ‘operations, policy challenges and capability development’ (PM&C 2015b, p. iv). 
Changes have also been affected at the Ministerial level, with Justice Minister Michael Keenan adding ‘Minister 
Assisting the Prime Minister on Counter-Terrorism’ to his role, and NSW senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells adding 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Attorney-General to her current duties in the social services portfolio. Both roles will 
have a strong focus on countering violent extremism and, in Keenan’s case, policy supervision through Moriarty’s 
new centre. The veteran Liberal MP Philip Ruddock, a former Attorney-General, will also become the Prime 
Minister’s special envoy for Citizenship and Community Engagement. These appointments reflect the growing 
workload in the counterterrorism space, and a new emphasis on community engagement by the government. But 
they also create some complex working arrangements, as Senator Brandis explains (see the box below) and we’ve 
tried to depict in Figure 4. 
The government has also taken the initiative to revise the National Terrorism Public Alert System and introduce new 
programs aimed at countering violent extremism. These initiatives will be discussed in the following sections.
 
Attorney-General, Senator the Hon George Brandis. Comments to the Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs Legislation Committee, 27 May 2015
‘Hitherto, the Attorney-General’s portfolio comprised two ministers: me and the Minister for Justice, Michael 
Keenan, who reported to me. Now, the Attorney-General’s portfolio will comprise three frontbench positions: 
me, Mr Keenan, who will continue to report to me, and Senator Concetta Fierravanti-Wells who, as well as 
being the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Social Services, is also the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Attorney-General. In relation to those aspects of the Attorney-General’s portfolio, she will also report to me. As well, 
Mr Keenan has been sworn as the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Counter-Terrorism. I will explain what that 
means in a moment, but in that respect he will report directly to the Prime Minister.
Mr Keenan’s two particular functions are to be, at the political level, the minister responsible for counter-terrorism 
coordination; and his position is the parallel political position of Mr Greg Moriarty, who will be an associate secretary 
within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Mr Moriarty will be the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
which means, to use a phrase the Prime Minister has used, he will have a helicopter view of all the different 
counter-terrorism functions across departments and agencies.
As you probably know, Senator, ASIO is in the Attorney-General’s Department. That is the principal national security 
agency. ASIS, which is the foreign intelligence agency, is in DFAT. ASD and AGO are in the Defence department, and 
ONA, which is the Office of National Assessments, which is an assessor and analyst rather than a collector, is in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. All of those agencies contribute to the overall counter-terrorism 
intelligence framework of the government, and then there are the law-enforcement agencies, particularly the 
Australian Federal Police, which also sit within the Attorney-General’s Department. Because not all of the agencies 
with a role in the counter-terrorism response sit within the one department, the Prime Minister took the view, at my 
recommendation, that there should be an individual above all within PM&C whose role is to coordinate all, and his 
ministerial equivalent is Mr Keenan. That is the first aspect of Mr Keenan’s augmented role. Secondly, Mr Keenan has 
been given particular responsibility for CVE programs run by the Attorney-General’s Department, and in that respect 
he will continue to report to me. Senator Fierravanti-Wells will also have responsibility for the multicultural aspect, 
or the multicultural dimension, of CVE, and community cohesion and engagement generally. She will report to me 
insofar as those programs are delivered by the Attorney-General’s portfolio, and to Mr Morrison insofar as those 
social cohesion programs.’ (Australian Senate 2015b, pp. 112-13)
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the national terrorism Public Alert System
Australia has a two-level system to categorise the threat of domestic terrorism: the threat level, which is classified 
and determined by the Director-General of ASIO, and the alert level, which is public and determined by the Prime 
Minister on the advice of ASIO.
The public alert system was revised in 2002 to include four levels: low, medium, high and extreme. On 12 September 
2014, the alert level was raised from ‘medium’ to ‘high’ by the Prime Minister on the advice of ASIO—Australia had 
been on ‘medium’ for 13 years before then. The previous day, outgoing ASIO Director-General David Irvine revealed 
that the classified threat level had gone up to ‘high’. This was the first time this information was made public.
However, the distinction between ‘threat’ and ‘alert’ isn’t always clear, and nor are the reasons for changing either. 
Some suspected that the move to elevate the public alert last year was driven by the government’s interest in 
garnering support for contentious aspects of its counterterrorism legislation, such as the mandatory retention 
of metadata.
Terrorism alert systems vary around the world, from formal and detailed tier systems to informal arrangements. 
Some Western countries don’t have any public alert system.
Absolute security from terrorism via a public warning system remains a pipedream. Unlike a fire or flood warning, a 
terrorism advisory will be much more general. But, despite its limitations, such a system can be useful in increasing 
community awareness about terrorism risks. It can also be helpful to security and law enforcement agencies asking 
for public assistance, since a change in the alert level can make the public more sensitive to anomalies. Terrorism 
advisories can also provide critical infrastructure operators with guidelines as to what a heightened threat means 
for them and how that might best guide their operations.
Findings from the January counterterrorism arrangements review
The report of the January 2015 Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery (PM&C 2015b:44) made the 
following findings on our terrorism advisories:
• Having two systems in place is unnecessarily complex, both for the public and for many officials.
• There isn’t enough flexibility or precision in the definition of the levels, making it difficult to raise and lower the 
alert level in response to a temporarily increased threat.
• As the threat of terrorism dominates the media, there’s a public expectation that the government will provide 
better information on such threats.
• Effective public communications should contain useful advice about required changes to behaviour.
The review recommended that the threat and alert systems be collapsed into one public system that would be 
determined by ASIO’s Director-General.
The new system should adopt new, clear language designed to better inform the public. It would also include 
an additional level, aimed at creating more granularity in the advice, see Figure 5. The review suggested that the 
new system would include narratives providing relevant information that could be updated to reflect different 
circumstances without having to change the threat level.
Our terrorism advisory system needs further reform. The review’s recommendations, along with our own, are 
discussed in Chapter 5.
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Figure 5: Current ‘public alert levels’ and proposed ‘threat levels’
Current Public 
Alert Levels
extreme
high
(12 September 2014)
Medium
(11 September 2014)
Low
Proposed threat 
Levels
Certain
expected
Probable
Possible
not expected
Source: PM&C 2015b, p. 46
Programs to counter violent extremism
The Australian Government has had programs in place since the mid-2000s to counter the ‘use or support of violence 
to achieve ideological, religious or political goals’ (AGD n.d. a). This element of a counterterrorism strategy is often 
the most controversial and difficult to implement, and it’s difficult to measure its effectiveness in tackling the root 
causes of terrorist activity.
Despite a lowering of funding to CVE programs in the 2013–14 Budget (Chan 2014), in August 2014 the Australian 
Government announced that it would include substantial funding for CVE-related work as part of its $630 million 
investment in counterterrorism mechanisms. This included $13.4 million towards the CVE Program. As well as 
working more broadly at strengthening community relationships, the focus of this work will be on:
• Community engagement—working with communities so they can help prevent at-risk individuals from moving 
down the path of radicalisation to violence
• The CVE intervention framework—early intervention and counter-radicalisation activities to help support at-risk 
individuals to deradicalise and disengage from violent ideologies, including through diversion activities such as 
mentoring, education and employment support and counselling (SSCLCA 2014).
To counter the threat from online propaganda, the government invested a further $22 million (Australian 
Government 2015b). The focus of this work will be to:
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• establish real-time social media monitoring and reporting capability to better understand extremist narratives 
and their impact on Australians
• limit the appeal of terrorist narratives
• empower community and civil society voices to combat terrorist narratives
• reduce access to extremist material online. (Brandis 2015b)
As part of this work, the government has asked for applications from organisations involved in CVE work 
for incorporation into the Directory of CVE Intervention Services, which ‘will be used by state, territory and 
Commonwealth authorities when coordinating specific intervention programs for individuals in need’ (AGD n.d. b). 
The directory will initially include six broad categories of services: religious and multicultural mentoring; specialised 
mental health services; education and employment counselling; youth and community work; case management; 
and telephone and online counselling. The government has allocated around $1 million for the Living Safe Together 
Grants Programme in 2014–15 only, stating that ‘there will be no further funding rounds available in coming years’ 
(AGD n.d. c). As things currently stand, there’s less information available on the contents of the remaining practical 
components of the CVE Programme, which need to be addressed soon in order to progress this difficult but 
essential area of work.
Australia recently hosted a Regional Summit to Counter Violent Extremism which was an excellent contribution to 
not only regional, but national level efforts to build capacity in this important area of work. The summit included 
workshops to raise awareness about using social media for CVE, developing CVE strategies and community-led 
intervention programs.  In the coming months it will be important to see this rolled out across the states and 
territories to raise awareness of what can be done and the support that the government can provide.
the Muslim community response
The increased focus on the terrorist threat in Australia since 2014 has revived a narrative similar to the one that 
emerged after the 2005 London bombings. References to ‘homegrown’ terrorism in the wake of those attacks 
created concern in Australia that Muslims, especially youth, might opt for similar militant actions.
That fear appeared to subside over the years, but concerns have re-emerged with reports of Muslim youth leaving 
Australia to engage in jihad as foreign fighters. Video footage of some young Muslims fighting on behalf of ISIL has 
emerged—and been continuously discussed in the media—against the background of the government’s legislation 
and announcements of practical measures to deal with the problem. Research suggests that this has reinforced 
perceptions in some sections of Australia’s non-Muslim communities that Muslims are the ‘other’—they are 
perceived as not belonging. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this sense of Muslims as the ‘other’ might be present 
among younger Australians as well. Political leaders have continued to demand that Muslim leaders do more to 
counter radicalisation. On 23 February 2015, for example, Prime Minister Abbott said, ‘I’ve often heard Western 
leaders describe Islam as a “religion of peace”. I wish more Muslim leaders would say that more often, and mean it.’ 
Such demands and assessments are likely to lead to more non-Muslim Australians developing a distrust of Muslims 
living among them.
Elements within Muslim communities have responded to stronger anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies by 
strengthening their view that there’s a deeply entrenched hostility towards them. In the West, this has contributed 
to a heightened fear of the state in Muslim communities. It has also led some other sections of society to view 
Muslims—not just youth but all Muslims—as unreliable citizens or even as non-citizens. As in the immediate 
aftermath of the London bombings, some Muslims have opted to play down their Islamic identity to avoid being 
noticed. Others have shared stories of harassment by the authorities when leaving or returning to Australia.
Against this background, qualitative interviews with a small cohort of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents under 
35 years of age suggested a pattern of growing anxieties. For example, some young Muslims argued that the wider 
community in Australia is against Islam and not just Islamophobic. They acknowledged that the failure of Muslim 
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communities to engage with the wider community might be an explanation, but they felt that the government’s 
emphasis on the terrorist threat posed by Muslims creates the possibility of innocent Muslims being subliminally 
doubted by the wider community. As one respondent said, ‘When they hear about a Muslim joining ISIL, they may 
not say it to you but they may think that you are like them too.’ This ‘reflected identification’ of all Muslim youth 
carries the risk of alienating them or reducing their participation as full citizens in Australia.
Those who participated in interviews to discuss their perceptions of government responses to the terrorist threat 
seemed rather unconcerned about the nature of the threat. The threat of terrorism seemed to attract less of their 
attention than we initially assumed to be the case.3
It could be argued that the reactions of the Australian Muslim and non-Muslim communities partly reflect fear and 
concerns about personal and communal safety. But scepticism, a focus on exploring causes for the tendency among 
some Muslims to opt for terrorism-related activities, and the heightened media focus on the terrorist threat posed 
by some Muslim extremists run the risk of sending a message that could be subliminally internalised by some young 
non-Muslim Australians. This may also be creating disillusionment among some Muslims about being ‘othered’. In 
the long term, the current focus could emerge as a factor contributing to reduced communal harmony.
International cooperation
Australia has maintained a strong counterterrorism cooperation program for the past decade. This important 
investment, which has cost about $5 million over the past three years, opens communications channels and 
makes it easier for Australian authorities to work with Southeast Asian and other international counterparts. 
Importantly, cooperation spans a wide range of activities, including education, hardware acquisition, operations 
and information exchanges.
The relationship with Indonesia has been deeply important for counterterrorism over the past decade. It has 
included close cooperation on investigations and information sharing, and cooperation in related areas, including 
the general educational field. There’s also been a number of law enforcement capacity-building activities, 
including in the areas of intelligence, cyber-investigations, disaster victim identification, prisons and chemical 
explosives precursors. Despite some recent turmoil in the bilateral relationship, counterterrorism cooperation 
remained strong. That will be increasingly important over the next few years. Indonesia faces real challenges as 
radicalised fighters in Middle East conflicts return from organisations such as ISIL, and terrorists imprisoned after 
the Bali bombings are released to join the existing groups that have been conducting constant low-level attacks 
in Indonesia.
Australia’s cooperation with Indonesia extends to the joint management of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation. The centre, which has been running for over 10 years, conducts courses on terrorism-related issues, 
including in the cyber domain. It’s also active in investigations, disaster victim identification and forensics. The 
centre’s a significant resource for regional counterterrorism: it’s professional, trusted and highly regarded.
Australia has developed cooperative activities with a number of other Southeast Asian states. Cooperation with 
the Philippines has probably been second to the relationship with Indonesia. It reflects humanitarian, criminal and 
security concerns shared by the two nations. This cooperation has included work on prisons, counter-kidnapping 
and grassroots initiatives for inter-faith dialogue. Other areas of regional cooperation include work with Interpol 
in such areas as the movement of foreign fighters, explosives precursors, and chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and explosive materials.
Broader international cooperation will also be important. In addition to taking part in the military operation in 
Iraq, Australia has been an important voice in the UN. This has involved leading the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, 
which has taken a role in monitoring terrorist groups in Syria over the past year. This work builds on long-term 
3 These findings are based on qualitative research conducted by contributor Samina Yasmeen.
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contributions to other activities, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the international centre for 
countering violent extremism, Hedayah.
With this track record, Australia and the region are well placed to ramp up cooperation on today’s key problem 
areas—foreign fighters and terrorism financing. However, our discussions with regional experts have identified 
only a patchy ability among Southeast Asian states to implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions 
concerning these two problem areas (see box).
What’s needed now is a new round of regional cooperation, including in the areas of information sharing, legislative 
tools, harmonisation, capacity building and best practice to prevent travel by foreign fighters. New examples of this 
type of cooperation include the agreements between Australia and France, and—more problematically—between 
Australia and Iran, to share intelligence about terrorism (Australian Government 2014, Bishop 2015b).
UN Security Council resolutions 2170, 2178 and 2199
The UN Security Council is concerned about foreign terrorist fighters. Three resolutions passed in late 2014 and early 
2015 aim to stop the flow of foreign fighters to the Middle East, in particular, and to cut off any resources that might 
assist their activities.
Resolutions 2170 and 2178 require member states to stop the travel of foreign fighters, prevent arms and funds 
movements to ISIL and report relevant individuals to the sanctions committee, while encouraging engagement with 
those at risk of radicalisation.
More specifically, Resolution 2199 condemns any direct or indirect trade with ISIL in oil, hostages or antiquities, as 
well as the making of donations that might be used by the organisation. This resolution also notes the destruction of 
cultural heritage by ISIL.
ChAPteR 5
Policy recommendations
Australia’s counter terrorism policies cover a vast range of responses, from military operations in the Middle East 
to community resilience and deradicalisation programs. Over more than a decade, and with renewed emphasis 
since late 2013, there’s been intense federal and growing state government policy activity. Here we recommend 
nine steps, in some cases building on current or nascent programs, to strengthen the Australian response to defeat 
terrorists and Gen Y extremist jihadists.
1. explain the reasons for Australia’s Middle east deployments more persuasively
Australia has a long history of fighting wars in the Middle East. Participation in those conflicts was based on 
contemporary judgements about our strategic interest, but our policy focus on the region has been inconsistent 
and driven by crises. We have few deep specialists in the Middle East in any part of public administration. The 
strategic drivers of change in the Middle East are seldom publicly explained or related to the purpose of Australian 
military involvement. A deeper knowledge of the region will produce more effective counterterrorism policies. 
The government should ensure that our diplomatic presence in the Middle East is sufficient to address the security 
interests that we claim to have there. This calls for modestly increased investment in Australian diplomatic, 
intelligence and defence engagement in the region. The opening of an Australian diplomatic mission in Doha, 
announced in May 2015, is a welcome development.
Based on a developing deeper understanding of the region, the Australian Government should continue the 
practice adopted in recent years of making regular statements to Parliament about Australia’s military operations 
and counterterrorism interests in the Middle East, including setting out the strategic rationale for those activities. 
The government should also engage more directly with online critics of Australian policy by using means such as 
ministers’ and senior officials’ speeches, opinion pieces in newspapers and credible websites.
2. Urgently expand counterterrorism cooperation with key international partners
Following a late April 2015 visit to Paris, Prime Minister Abbott and President Francois Hollande issued a joint 
statement promising to:
• deepen our exchanges on national security policy, including responses to terrorism, countering violent 
extremism and online radicalisation
• extend our dialogue on the challenges posed by the phenomenon of foreign fighters
• further strengthen intelligence cooperation
• establish a program of exchanges in counterterrorism policing, including on tactical response policing 
(Abbott 2015a).
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This is a welcome measure, albeit one that challenges Canberra’s dogged orthodoxy that Australia’s foreign policy 
interests reside solely in Asia. Australia has a deep interest in working with like-minded countries not only on 
police and intelligence cooperation but to strengthen policy thinking on domestic counter-radicalisation. That 
should prompt an expansion of the Prime Minister’s initiative to Germany, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. 
These countries are in effect the new front line in dealing with a wave of radicalisation sweeping Western societies. 
Substantial international cooperation already takes place, most effectively with Australia’s Five Eyes intelligence 
partners—the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand. But the tempo needs to be stepped up if it’s to address the 
demands of domestic security in an accelerating threat environment.
Australia could play an important international role by gathering the best thinking on policy, intelligence and 
policing on counterterrorism and de-radicalisation strategies. This should include more active sharing of the 
profiles of individuals who have been radicalised, as a foundation for thinking about necessary responses. The 
Establishment of a Foreign Fighters Taskforce under the auspicious of the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) is 
directed to strengthening international cooperation in this area. The Commission reported to Senate Estimates 
hearings in May 2015 that it was ‘deploying officers in the coming year to Asia, the USA, Canada, Europe and the 
Middle East. We are doing that in conjunction with the Australian Federal Police and other partners internationally’ 
(Dawson 2015, p.52). The ACC has coercive powers to compel individuals and organisations to provide information 
when questioned. In September 2014 the ACC advised that they had ‘conducted 40 coercive hearings on 24 
individuals’ in the previous twelve months (Keenan 2014).
Of course, cooperation with European and North American partners shouldn’t come at the expense of regional 
engagement, but, with the exception of work with Singapore and Japan, this engagement will be more likely to 
focus on responses than on preventive measures.
3. Set a new basis for collaboration with Australian Muslims
Writing in The Australian, Deakin University academic Shahram Akbarzadeh (2015) set out the challenging reality for 
Australian Muslims:
… let’s not forget Muslim community organisations have a big role to play. It may not be clear to some, but 
Australian Muslims are the first to suffer the consequences of terrorism. The shame of having a member of 
the faith commit acts of violence in the name of religion, and the subsequent anti-Muslim backlash, affect all 
Australian Muslims. They have a stake in addressing extremism and need to be acknowledged as partners for an 
effective counterterrorism strategy.
There’s no escaping this difficult situation. While the vast majority of Australian Muslims have no sympathy for 
or engagement with Islamist radicals, the Muslim community must be part of a coherent national response to 
terrorism. Australia as a whole must find a way to work with Australian Muslims that’s creative and respectful and 
doesn’t blame the community for the behaviour of a tiny group. There’s no substitute for dialogue at many levels, 
but counterterrorism presents something of a linguistic minefield. In late 2014, Prime Minister Abbott used the term 
‘Team Australia’ to describe his sense of the community effort needed to address terrorism:
I can’t make myself plainer. This is not about any particular community, this is about crime and potential crime 
… [A]s far as I am concerned, every Australian is part of our team. Every Australian is part of our team. The phrase 
I like is ‘Team Australia’ and the beauty of Team Australia is that anybody who is prepared to show a commitment 
to this country is part of it. (Abbott 2014)
Although well intended, arguably the language didn’t resonate well with people who felt alienated from the 
community and unable to benefit from mainstream community life. It’s notable that the Prime Minister has ceased 
to use the ‘Team Australia’ phrase. An important way to restart this discussion would be for the Prime Minister, 
perhaps with the involvement of the Leader of the Opposition, to establish an advisory council on counterterrorism 
and the community. 
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Any engagement program needs to operate on the basis that there is no single Muslim community in Australia; 
there are a variety of diverse communities based on different cultural and ethnic backgrounds and on different 
interpretations of Islam. Understanding diversity and accommodating this to policy is key.
Initiatives to foster resilience within communities, as set out in Living Safe Together, should be continued. We 
should also recognise that those disengaged and possibly more susceptible to extremism are not likely to listen to 
community leaders. There’s a need to ensure that attempts to engage at-risk people filter down to the levels of the 
community where it is most needed, and that these messages will indeed be accessible. 
An effort should be made to include young people and others who aren’t part of formal community groups, as well 
as respected Muslim community leaders. Empowering young members of Muslim communities in their religious and 
secular endeavours could enable new forms of community leadership. A platform to tell ‘success stories’ of Muslims 
Australians might help to promote social cohesion amongst Muslims and non-Muslims nationally. A key task will be 
to build trust within this group, which will happen only after a sustained effort to discuss, listen and collaborate.
4. engage schools in a practical discussion about terrorism and counter-
radicalisation
A younger group of people is being attracted to violent jihad in the Middle East. The internet and social media 
may just be the latest communications channel available to terror groups, but they are particularly effective 
means to direct unfiltered messages to specific groups at the same time as allowing communication between 
like-minded people. As jihadists get younger, our attention must turn to what schools teach and how they manage 
at-risk students.
On the curriculum front, schools face substantial time pressures to teach all necessary subjects. But there’s surely 
a case to start discussing Australia’s contemporary role in the Middle East—perhaps as a follow-on to studies on 
Gallipoli, which was also a key strategic challenge a century ago. The New South Wales History K–10 syllabus, for 
example, allows for at least the possibility of classes on contemporary security issues in the subject ‘Australia 
and the modern world’ (Board of Studies, n.d.). This should be broadened so that students can access balanced 
information on the Middle East and terrorism, rather than relying on radical online material.
How schools should deal with students showing potential signs of radicalisation is an even more delicate topic. 
Under the Living Safe Together initiative, the Australian Government provides online advice aimed at helping people 
to recognise whether an individual may be radicalising (AGD, n.d. d). Counter-radicalisers say that early intervention 
is advisable and point to the range of social and healthcare services available to all Australians but, aside from that, 
thinking about the early intervention roles that schools could play is at a promising but tentative stage. In May 2015, 
the Victorian Government announced that it would provide $25 million over four years ‘to enlist young role models 
to engage with people at risk of radicalisation’ (Tomazin 2015). The initiative will involve the state’s education, youth, 
multicultural affairs and police agencies and community representatives. It’s likely that more state government 
initiatives will follow. Although welcome, the proliferation of governments, agencies and groups all pursuing 
counter-radicalisation initiatives has the potential to create confusion.
Given the complexity of this issue and the numbers of players involved, a useful approach would be for the 
Australian Government to raise this issue in discussions at the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). The COAG 
meeting of 17 April 2015 agreed that a new national counterterrorism strategy would be developed. This would 
include developing strategies to ‘work with communities to identify and manage individuals at risk of radicalisation’, 
and lead to further discussion at a COAG retreat in July 2015 (COAG 2015). The role of schools should be front and 
centre in this discussion. On 24 May 2015, it was announced that Education Minister Christopher Pyne is seeking to 
develop a ‘national strategy to combat radicalisation and extremism in schools’ and that this is to be discussed with 
state education ministers. This is a necessary and welcome development.
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5. Start a discussion with the media on reporting terrorism
Australian media reporting of the December 2014 Lindt Cafe siege in Sydney was sensibly restrained, and local 
media outlets refused to broadcast demands made by the gunman. The media’s use of ISIL propaganda videos, 
particularly of purported executions, has also become noticeably more restrained in recent months. This approach 
reflects the difficult balance that media organisations try to keep between informed reporting and inflaming 
tensions. There are many examples in which reporting has been less than helpful, either by broadcasting the latest 
ISIL video or by using headlines that generate community anger rather than inform people.
Under its mandate for ‘promoting good standards of media practice’ the Australian Press Council developed 
advisory guidelines for the use of religious terms in headlines:
The Press Council advises newspapers and magazines to be careful about using in their headlines terms for 
religious or ethnic groups that could imply that the group as a whole was responsible for the actions of a minority 
among that group. The use of the words ‘Islam’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’ in headlines on reports of terrorist attacks 
has caused problems both for the Muslim community in Australia and the Australian media. (APC 2004)
In addition to restating that advice, an updated set of guidelines should consider:
• appropriate terminology to describe ISIL
• handling strategies for using ISIL’s and other terrorist organisation’s propaganda (both violent material and 
non-violent recruitment videos)
• the suitability of adapting media standards for reporting on suicide and depression to reporting about 
individuals vulnerable to radicalisation
• the reporting of matters relating to the Muslim community in the context of terrorism.
The best way to develop a new advisory guideline would be for the government to start an open dialogue with a 
wide range of media representatives and, ultimately, for the Press Council to codify its own recommendations. 
Because of our engagement with government agencies and with the media, ASPI is prepared to assist in further 
developing this proposal.
6. develop individual case management strategies for at-risk people
The government’s Living Safe Together initiative, which began in August 2014, emphasises the importance of early 
identification and early intervention to assist people who are on a path to radicalisation and divert them onto 
more productive paths. The Living Safe Together website points to ‘Intervention programmes [that] may include 
youth diversion activities, healthcare initiatives, mentoring, employment and educational pathway support and 
counselling’ (AGD n.d. e). This reflects a broadening of the government’s approach to cover counterterrorism 
mitigation strategies that include social services delivery. This approach offers promising possibilities, but a great 
deal of additional work will need to be done to define how an intervention process might work, where authority 
to decide to intervene will reside, and how to handle an individual from the point of intervention. The handover 
point from law enforcement to social service agencies will need careful definition, as will the nature of cooperation 
between federal and state agencies and community groups. Early and important work is already underway in this 
area, but much more needs to be done.
An important starting point to think through what’s needed to manage people being diverted from radicalisation 
would be to bring security and social services delivery agencies together to discuss cooperation. These are different 
worlds, so substantial give and take will be needed to develop a shared understanding. The value of a successful 
diversion program would be great, given the massive costs of policing operations to thwart terror plots and the 
human and social costs of terrorist acts.
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7. Combat online propaganda
Online propaganda produced by ISIL and other terrorist groups presents a different and more serious threat than 
al-Qaeda’s slower and stodgier efforts of a decade ago:
• Production values are higher, and the products are designed to appeal to people with a false image of the 
adventure that awaits a radicalised recruit.
• Response times in producing propaganda are faster, so producers can take advantage of current developments 
being reported by mainstream media.
• Online presentation is not diluted by media outlets and can easily be switched to other sites if internet service 
providers or governments block distribution.
• A receptive audience seeks the product and can be reached globally.
• The online environment facilitates networking and the broader dissemination of the propaganda.
These qualities of the online environment make combating ISIL propaganda more challenging. However, 
the internet’s just a channel: the key task for counterterrorism is to undermine the content of the 
propagandist’s message.
A major ASPI study by Roslyn Richardson, Fighting fire with fire: target audience responses to online anti-violence 
campaigns, found in November 2013 that government online counter-radicalisation campaigns were unlikely to 
succeed (Richardson 2013). Based on detailed research with young Muslims in Sydney, Richardson found that young 
people were unlikely to trust governments, didn’t regard them as being on the same side, and didn’t consider 
that CVE strategies addressed issues of most importance to them. The report recommended that governments 
assist efforts underway within the Muslim community to develop the community’s own alternative online material 
opposing radicalisation. This approach needs to be complemented by face-to-face engagement, a process of 
trust building, recognition of the importance of selecting the right language to describe the problem, and an 
understanding of the significant differences of attitude that exist within the Muslim community.
Where government offers content online, it needs to ensure that this material has the quality, timeliness, reach 
and attention to language that’s needed to engage and persuade a sceptical audience. For a number of years, 
the government, with the Attorney-General’s Department leading the way, has assisted in developing thinking 
about online counter-radicalisation. The need now is to deploy a range of responses able to rapidly change to 
meet new propaganda challenges and to find ways to build community acceptance. Harnessing the expertise of 
communication, marketing and social media experts could facilitate this. Some $21 million has been spent so far on 
limiting the impact of terrorist narratives on domestic audiences (AGD n.d. b).
8. Revise the public terrorism advisory system
Anthony Bergin and Clare Murphy (2015) have pointed out the following about Australia’s threat and 
warning system.
Our usually classified terrorism threat level and public alert level were both raised to ‘high’ in September 2014. 
This was the first time that ASIO made the threat level public and raised it to ‘high’: we’d been on medium level for 
13 years. There was some confusion about how the public was supposed to react to the raised alert level, and about 
the role that terrorism advisories play in our counterterrorism machinery.
Five immediate changes could help. First, it would be sensible to collapse the two systems into one public alert 
system, decided by the Director-General of ASIO, that can be made public and accompanied by an unclassified 
narrative. Second, there should be a sunset clause that mandates the expiry of a raised level after six months unless 
there’s evidence that it shouldn’t be changed. Third, a generic alert level system isn’t appropriate for a country as 
large as Australia. Our terrorism warning system should offer more advice about likely areas at increased risk. This 
would strengthen the system as an effective tool for communicating useful information to the public.
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Our fourth suggestion is that the language used for terrorism advisories shouldn’t be arbitrary or ambiguous. It 
would be prudent to test the narratives, and especially what the system suggests that people do, at each level to 
see how useful the public finds them. Finally, a public awareness campaign communicating any changes to our 
terrorism advisories would be helpful. This should include social media. The Australian Government should have a 
national security Facebook page and Twitter account to provide information on terrorism warnings. We set out the 
case for these changes in more detail in our study, Sounding the alarm: terrorism threat communications with the 
Australian public (Bergin & Murphy 2015).
9. explain how government agencies use counterterrorism powers
The Australian Parliament has given law enforcement and intelligence agencies extensive new powers to deal with 
the terrorism threat. While some measures have been controversial, experience to date has shown these changes to 
be necessary and proportional. Australian agencies are also deeply engaged in counterterrorism operations here 
and overseas and conduct many cooperative activities with international partners. However, community support 
for these powers and actions is essential for maintaining confidence in the existing arrangements and for arguing 
the case for any future additions or expansions to powers.
Australian governments, through COAG, should promote confidence in our agencies by presenting a 12-monthly 
public update on the use of counterterrorism powers in Australia. That report should include all information 
required by law (for example, reporting on the use of delayed notification warrants and the data retention scheme) 
but also detailed information on relevant matters such as the use of control orders, passport cancellations, numbers 
of continuing investigations, individuals referred for diversion programs, international cooperation activities, 
relevant financial actions, court outcomes, and reporting about police and military operations. Of course, the report 
should respect the privacy of individuals and the security of intelligence and operations. Beyond that, it should 
present a comprehensive explanation of how and why the agencies have used their powers, and what’s been done 
in the Australian public’s name to supress terrorism here and overseas.
APPendIX 1
This table includes those individuals named in open-source materials as having allegedly advocated or participated 
in violent Islamist activities since 2011. The table has been updated to 23 May 2015. The profiles and database 
information in this report are based on open-source material. This has mostly included online media articles and 
some government reporting. Sources can be found in the online version of the Appendix 1 at www.aspi.org.au. 
Name Year 
born*
Age at 
time of 
publication 
or death*
Country of 
birth
Ethnicity Australian 
citizen
Comment
Roger ABBAS 1989 23 Unknown Lebanese Y Reported to have been a foreign 
fighter for Jabhat al-Nusra. 
Reportedly killed in October 2012.
Hodan ABBY 1996 18 Unknown Somali Y Reportedly travelled to Syria to 
join ISIL with Hafsa Mohamed in 
December 2014. The pair is cited as 
the first known Australian women to 
travel to Syria/Iraq independently.
Mahmoud 
ABDULLATIF
1991 23 Australia Unknown Y Travelled to Syria in September 
2014. Reported by his wife to have 
been killed in January 2015.
Ahmed 
Mohammed 
AL-GHAZZAWI
Unknown Unknown Lebanon Lebanese Y Reported foreign fighter for ISIL, 
killed 26 December 2014.
Abu Nour 
AL-IRAQI (birth 
name unknown)
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Y Reported foreign fighter for ISIL. 
Featured in an ISIL recruitment 
video (There is no life without jihad), 
which was released in mid-2014. 
Omar AL-KUTOBI 1990 24 Iraq Iraqi (assumed) N Charged with plotting a terrorist 
attack in Sydney on 10 February 
2015, using a knife and machete, 
with Mohammed Kiad. 
Hamdi AL-QUDSI 1974 40 Unknown Unknown Y Charged with offences after 
allegations that he recruited and 
assisted seven Australians to travel 
to Syria and fight with extremist 
forces, including Jabhat al-Nusra in 
early 2013. Allegedly the liaison for 
Mohammad Ali Baryalei.
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Mehran AZAMI 1995 19 Unknown Unknown Unknown Charged with acting as the weapons 
supplier for the Anzac Day 2015 
plot to kill a police officer, steal his 
weapon and use it to attack as many 
people as possible.
Omarjan AZARI 1992 22 Afghanistan Afghani Y Charged with plotting with 
Mohamed Ali Baryalei to publicly 
execute a person in Sydney, cover 
them with an ISIL flag and film the 
ordeal. Also faces charges arising 
from allegations that he made funds 
available to ISIL. 
Mohammad Ali 
BARYALEI
1981 33 Afghanistan Afghani Y Travelled to Syria to join 
Jabhat al Nusra in April 2013, 
converted to ISIL by June 2013, 
and believed to have adopted 
operational command position for 
ISILfacilitating passage for 30-60 
Australians. Reportedly killed in 
October 2014.
Abdul Nacer 
BENBRIKA
1960 54 Algeria Algerian Y Convicted for directing the 
actions of terrorist organisation 
that planned attacks at the 2005 
AFL Grand Final at the MCG in 
Melbourne. Reportedly coaching 
new jihadists from jail.
Sevdet Ramden 
BESIM
1996 18 Unknown Unknown Unknown Charged with conspiring in the 
Anzac Day plot. 
Mehmet BIBER 1993 21 Unknown Turkish Y Allegedly facilitated by Hamdi 
Al-Qudsi to travel to Syria to join an 
extremist group. 
Jake BILARDI 1996 18 Australia Anglo-Australian Y Reportedly left Australia in August 
2014 to join ISIL, leaving a collection 
of materials to create an explosion 
in his family home. Reportedly 
detonated a bomb in Ramadi, on 11 
March 2015, killing only himself.
Oliver 
BRIDGEMAN
1996 18 Australia 
(assumed)
Anglo-Australian Y Reportedly left Australia in April 
2015 to join Jabhat al-Nusra, before 
trying to return home. Concedes 
that he’s living in an area controlled 
by Jabhat al-Nusra but denies 
taking part in fighting. 
59
ASPI STRATEGY
APPENDIX 1
Name Year 
born*
Age at 
time of 
publication 
or death*
Country of 
birth
Ethnicity Australian 
citizen
Comment
Adam 
BROOKMAN
Unknown Unknown Australia Anglo-Australian 
(assumed)
Y Reportedly travelled to Syria and 
joined ISIL. Self-reported that 
he was undertaking aid work as 
a nurse and was forcibly held in 
an ISIL hospital after injury. He 
is negotiating with Australian 
authorities for his return at time 
of publication. 
Tyler CASEY 
(Yusuf Ali)
1991 22 US African-American 
/Anglo-Australian
Y Reportedly travelled to Syria 
allegedly to join Jabhat al-Nusra 
between June and August 2013, 
allegedly facilitated by Hamdi 
al-Qudsi. Reportedly killed with his 
wife Amira Karroum in their Syrian 
home in January 2014.
Harun CAUSEVIC 1996 18 Unknown Bosnian Y Charged with conspiring in the 
Anzac Day plot. 
Adam DAHMAN 1996 18 Australia Unknown Y Known as Australia’s second known 
suicide bomber, reportedly killed 
five people in a marketplace in 
Baghdad on 17 July 2014.
Zehra DUMAN 1993 21 Australia Turkish Y Reportedly travelled to Syria in 
2014 to marry Mahmoud Abdullatif. 
Emerged as strong supporter of ISIL 
online, encouraging women to join. 
Abdullah ELMIR 1997 17 Australia Anglo-Australian Y Reportedly left Melbourne in June 
2014 to join ISIL, and appeared in 
two ISIL propaganda videos. 
Fatima ELOMAR 1985 29 Unknown Unknown Y Arrested in May 2014 after 
attempting to board a flight to 
Malaysia with her four children. It 
was alleged that she intended to 
travel to Syria to join her husband, 
Mohamed Elomar, carrying money 
and supplies, including camouflage 
gear. Charged with supporting 
incursions into a foreign state 
with the intention of engaging in 
hostile activities.
Mohamed 
ELOMAR
1984 30 Australia Lebanese Y Australian foreign fighter who was 
reportedly based in Syria. He was 
reportedly killed in June 2015.
Abdul Numan 
HAIDER
1996 18 Afghanistan Afghani Y Shot and killed in stabbing attack 
on police in Melbourne on 23 
September 2014.
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Zia Abdul HAQ 1981 33 Afghanistan Afghani 
(assumed)
Y Reported foreign fighter for ISIL. 
Left Australia in August 2014 and 
was reportedly killed in fighting on 3 
October 2014. 
Irfaan HUSSEIN 1995 19 Unknown Unknown Unknown Reported foreign fighter for ISIL. 
Believed killed while fighting in 
March 2015, as a result of either a 
beheading or a bomb blast. 
Sharky JAMA 1989 25 Somalia Somali Y Reportedly left to fight with ISIL 
in August 2014, approximately the 
same time as friend Yusuf Yusuf. 
Reportedly killed in April 2015. 
Dullel KASSAB 1986 28 Unknown Unknown Y Reportedly travelled with her 
4-year-old daughter and 2-year-old 
son to Raqqah in mid-2014 after her 
husband was killed in Syria. Owner 
of a Twitter account that’s followed 
by many female ISIL supporters. 
Amira KARROUM 1991 22 Australia Lebanese /
Anglo-New 
Zealand
Y Travelled to Syria to join her 
husband Yusuf Ali in December 2013 
but both were killed in their Syrian 
home after her arrival.
Tareq KAMLEH 1985 29 Australia 
(assumed)
German / 
Palestinian
Y Reportedly travelled to Syria to 
join ISIL. He has self-reported that 
he is using his medical training to 
assist with medical services in ISIL 
held territory. 
Sulayman KHALID 1994 20 Australia Iraqi / Italian Y Wore Islamic State flag on SBS 
Insight, and stormed out after being 
questioned about his beliefs, in 
August 2014. Charged in December 
2014 with possessing hand-written 
notes allegedly planning to target 
an AFP building and an attack in the 
Blue Mountains. 
Mohammed KIAD 1989 25 Kuwait Kuwaiti 
(assumed)
N 
(Family & 
spousal visa)
Charged with plotting to execute 
a terrorist attack in Sydney on 10 
February 2015, using a knife and 
machete, with Omar al-Kutobi. 
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Agim KRUEZI 1993 21 Australia Albanian Y Stopped at Brisbane Airport on 9 
March 2014 because of suspicions 
that he was travelling to fight in the 
conflict in Iraq and Syria. Arrested 
in police raids in Queensland in 
September 2014. Charged with 
recruiting people for ISIL between 
July 2013 and September 2014, 
possessing numerous objects 
and transporting a firearm in 
preparation for a terrorist act. 
Mostafa 
MAHAMED 
(Abu Sulayman 
al Muhajir)
1984 30 Egypt Egyptian Y Extremist preacher in Sydney who 
reportedly travelled to Syria to join 
Jabhat al-Nusra. 
Abdul Salam  
MAHMOUD 
Unknown Unknown Sudan Sudanese Y Self-reported to have travelled 
to Syria, stating that he was 
undertaking humanitarian work. 
Was active on social media; posted 
supporting ISIL and Numan 
Haider, and calling for Muslims to 
retaliate against US-led air strikes. 
Reportedly killed in March 2015. 
Hafsa MOHAMED 1995 20 Unknown Somali Y Reportedly travelled to Syria to join 
ISIL with Hodan Abby in December 
2014. The pair is cited as the first 
known Australian women to travel 
to Syria/Iraq independently. 
Man Haron MONIS 1964 50 Iran Iranian Y Committed the Sydney Siege (2 
victims killed, 4 others injured) on 
15-16 December 2014. Killed by 
police on 16 December 2014.
Ahmad 
MOUSSALLI
1983 30 Unknown Lebanese Y Reportedly studied Arabic in Egypt 
from late 2012 and then is believed 
to have travelled into Syria around 
2013. He was reportedly killed in 
February 2014.
Tara NETTLETON Unknown Unknown Australia Anglo-Australian Y Reportedly travelled to Syria with 
her five children to reunite with her 
husband, Khaled Sharrouf, in 2013. 
Neil PRAKASH 1991 23 Australia Fijian-Indian / 
Cambodian
Y Reportedly travelled to join ISIL 
and has reportedly become a top 
recruiter for the organisation. 
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Ezzit RAAD 1981 33 Australia Lebanese Y Convicted for involvement in 2005 
Operation Pendennis plot to bomb 
Melbourne landmarks. Soon after 
his release from jail, he reportedly 
left Australia to join ISIL in 2013.
Zakaryah RAAD 
(thought to 
be Abu Yahya 
ash Shami)
1992 22 Australia 
(assumed)
Lebanese Y Reported ISIL foreign fighter. 
Featured in ISIL video, ‘There is 
no life without jihad’, released on 
20 June 2014. Understood to have 
been appointed by ISIL as military 
commander of town of Jalula. 
Reportedly killed shortly after the 
filming of the video.
Suhan RAHMAN 1991 23 Australia Bangladeshi Y Reportedly travelled to Syria in 2014 
and joined ISIL. Reportedly killed in 
March 2015.
Hassan El 
SABSABI
1991 23 Unknown Unknown Unknown Charged with funding terrorist 
organisations overseas, including 
ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, 
with approximately $12,000 
over the period from March to 
September 2014.
Sammy SALMA 1990 22 Unknown Unknown Y Reportedly travelled with Roger 
Abbas to join Jabhat al-Nusra in 
Syria in October 2012. Killed in an 
explosion in Aleppo in April 2013.
Khaled 
SHARROUF
1981 33 Australia Lebanese Y Reportedly travelled to Syria to join 
ISIL using his brother’s passport. He 
was reportedly killed in June 2015.
Zaynab 
SHARROUF
2000 14 Australia 
(assumed)
Anglo-Australian 
/ Lebanese
Y Allegedly left Australia with 
her mother and four younger 
siblings to go to Syria to join the 
ISIL caliphate in February 2014. 
Reportedly made posts on social 
media indicating that she’d married 
Mohamed Elomar and other posts 
supporting ISIL.
Muhammed 
SHEGLABO
1991 23 Libya Libyan Unknown Reportedly travelled to join ISIL in 
January 2015. Posted photos on 
social media of him wearing combat 
clothing, holding weapons and 
using the ISIL hand gesture.
Abraham 
SUCCARIEH
1985 29 Australia Lebanese 
(assumed)
Y Reportedly travelled out of Australia 
on 10 September 2013 and is 
believed to be fighting with Jabhat 
al-Nusra. 
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Ahmed 
SUCCARIEH
1986 27 Australia Lebanese Y Reported to be Australia’s first 
suicide bomber,allegedly killing 35 
people at a military checkpoint in 
Syria in September 2013. Video of 
the incident was reportedly posted 
by Jabhat al Nusra.
Omar SUCCARIEH 1983 31 Australia Lebanese Y Arrested in Brisbane terror raids 
in October 2014 and charged 
with funding Jabhat al-Nusra and 
assisting Agim Kruezi to prepare for 
a hostile act in Syria. His bookstore 
was also raided. 
Caner TEMEL 1991 22 Australia Turkish Y Went missing from the ADF in 
mid-2010 and reportedly left for 
Syria in July 2013. He was allegedly 
facilitated by Hamdi Al-Qudsi. 
Reportedly fought with Jabhat 
al-Nusra and ISIL. Reportedly killed 
in January 2014. 
Yusuf YUSUF Unknown Unknown Unknown Somali Y Reportedly travelled to join ISIL 
approximately the same time as 
friend Sharky Jama in August 2014. 
Reportedly preaches to former 
friends online from Raqqah, Syria.
Mohamed ZUHBI Unknown Unknown Syria Syrian (assumed) Y Bank accounts closed in June 
2014 after he voiced support for 
ISIL online. Self-reported that he’s 
currently living in Syria and that he’s 
doing humanitarian work. 
* Approximate
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In September 2014 the terrorism threat level was raised from ‘medium’ to ‘high’— 
the first change in 13 years. This year, the government estimated that the number 
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Defeating terrorism and removing the sources of inspiration for radical extremism calls 
upon a massive array of policy responses covering everything from military operations 
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policy problem currently facing the country. It is also clear that governments cannot 
successfully develop counter-terrorism policy without the closest engagement of all 
sections of the community. Nothing less is at stake than the nature of Australian society.
